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ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF GENDER AND GROUPS IN ECONOMIC
DECISION MAKING
Jay Alan Schwarz, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
Groups collectively make many economic decisions. Corporate boards select CEOs or develop
strategic plans. School boards hire superintendents and develop policies. Here I study ways gender
may influence such group decisions. In Chapter 1, I study the formation of elected groups in an
environment where females are well represented. Using California school board elections data, I
estimate the electorate’s response to either an additional male or female serving on the school board.
I find that a female (male) winning the current election - and thus sitting on the board - increases
the number of males (females) elected in the next cycle. I hypothesize the electorate has a preferred
board gender composition it seeks to maintain. This result highlights that electoral environments
with high-female representation may be substantially different from the previously studied low-
female representation environments because in the former case voters have greater experience with
female officeholders. In Chapter 2, I use the same school board data and study whether increased
female representation on a school board affects a district’s academic performance. I find that
increasing the number of female board members has a positive impact on academic performance
for districts failing to meet state requirements. I also show gender in fact influences how a school
board executes its duty of monitoring the superintendent. For failing school districts, boards with
more females are less likely to experience a superintendent separation. Lastly, in Chapter 3, I use
an experimental design to study gender interactions within groups evaluating males and females
competing against one another in a task. I elicit individual group members’ evaluations and then
groups’ collective evaluations of the competitors. Consistent with studies of observational data, I
find only groups with either low or high numbers of females tend to favor the male competitor. By
mapping individuals to group decisions, I find this is partially explained by females being less likely
to influence the group decision if they disagree a priori with the majority opinion.
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1.0 ELECTION BEHAVIOR WITH HIGH-FEMALE REPRESENTATION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Decision-making institutions such as corporate boards and elected legislatures often have fewer fe-
males than males. Efforts worldwide have focused on understanding and reducing this gap. Recent
evidence from Indian (Beaman et al. 2009) and Italian (De Paola et al. 2010) elections finds that
under-representation results in part from voter ignorance about female leadership. That is, lack of
exposure to female leaders allows the electorate to hold mistaken beliefs about how a female would
govern. These inaccuracies tend to bias voters against females, causing statistical discrimination
against even qualified female candidates. I refer to this as “ignorance-based” discrimination. Fur-
thermore, these studies find the affirmative action policies of political reservations and ballot quotas
can be effective. Such policies directly increase female representation, and the additional exposure
voters have with female leadership serves to improve the accuracy of expectations concerning future
female candidates. This results in more females elected even after termination of the affirmative
action policies. This outcome is in line with Coate and Loury (1993) who discuss how affirmative
action may be effective because it gives individuals the opportunity to demonstrate capabilities.
These findings however raise an additional question. Do voters or corporate boards choosing
leaders behave differently in situations where they are familiar with female performance? Specifi-
cally, I ask how the gender of a previously elected official influences the genders of future winners.
This is essentially the same question addressed by Beaman et al. (2009) and De Paola et al. (2010)
but with a potentially important difference. In the electoral environment I study females are well
represented, meaning voters are unlikely to be ignorant about how a female will lead. Such sit-
uations are becoming increasingly common. For example, in the United States females of both
political parties hold a total of 96 Congressional seats. While only about 19% of the legislature,
this still affords voters the opportunity to form reasonably accurate expectations of how females
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will govern. In American industry, females occupy roughly 70% of managerial positions in the
health care and education fields (GAO 2010). In these fields, those making hiring and promotion
decision likely have accurate beliefs about how an average woman will perform. In effect, there is
little room for ignorance-based discrimination.
To address this issue, I study whether gender continues to matter in elections when females
already are well-represented as officeholders. One possibility is that gender ceases to be a factor
and the genders of those elected are essentially random. I call this “gender indifference.” A second
possibility is that gender continues to provide information that voters value. Voters may value
gender per se or may value the policy signal gender provides. For example, a wide array of evidence
shows that males and females make public policy decisions differently. Thomas (1991), Berkman and
O’Connor (1993), Vega and Firestone (1995), and Thomas and Welch (2001) all find divergence
in the behavior and priorities of men and women officials. A set of papers in the economics
literature shows that female decision makers increase health spending (Rehavi 2007), invest in more
public education (Clots-Figueras 2006), and provide for infrastructure important to their gender
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). Also, experimental work, such as Andreoni and Vesterlund
(2001), suggests women are more likely to be egalitarian, a relevant fact in public goods decision-
making. If voters recognize actual differences in how male and female officeholders govern, they may
use gender as a convenient screening device to practice “policy-based” statistical discrimination.
That is, voters may prefer a certain policy outcome and will elect candidates of a certain gender to
achieve in expectation the desired outcome.1
However, it is difficult to disentangle whether voters value gender per se or because of the policy
information gender provides. Voters may hold taste-based prejudices or affinities for one gender
or the other (i.e., a per se preference) apart from policy concerns. Yet, a voter’s actions resulting
from each preference motivation will tend to be similar. For the current discussion I do not try to
distinguish the two motivations. Rather, I make a distinction between voters’ having well-informed
preferences over gender (regardless of the motivation) as opposed to ignorant or indifferent gender
preferences.
Thus there are three possibilities for how past female elected officials may influence the genders
of future officials. First, if greater experience with a female reduces negative voter ignorance this
will increase a future female candidate’s probability of winning (Hypothesis 1). Second, if voters
1This may be especially true in low-information elections such as I consider where voters know little about
candidates aside from what is on the ballot (e.g., name). This is discussed by McDermott (1997).
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are indifferent to gender then no gender effect is expected (Hypothesis 2). Third, if voters hold well-
informed gender preferences then electing an additional female on average will generate demand
for males in reaction to the additional female, and vice versa (Hypothesis 3). The idea is that the
well-informed electorate has a preferred gender composition and will vote to achieve it. In this
paper I seek first to determine which hypothesis holds in a high-female representation situation.
The previous work in India and Italy attributes much of the under-representation of females to
ignorance-based discrimination. Yet, as females fill more management and governing positions,
ignorance should diminish while other types of discrimination may rise in relative importance.
I specifically study California school district governing board elections. Overall, females com-
prise 45% of school board members. This is near-parity and in stark contrast to the India (11%)
and Italy (7%) cases previously studied. I estimate the effect adding an additional female to the
board has on election outcomes and candidacy two years later as it regards gender. Each governing
board has officials elected in the two most recent elections. For this reason, who is currently on the
board is relevant information to voters in the current election. If additional experience with female
officials primarily reduces ignorance-based discrimination toward female candidates (as in India and
Italy), I expect an additional female officeholder to increase the likelihood females are subsequently
elected (Hypothesis 1). If voters are indifferent to gender I expect a zero effect (Hypothesis 2). If
voters hold well-informed gender preferences, I expect an additional female officeholder to decrease
the likelihood females are subsequently elected (Hypothesis 3). Since others have shown the effects
of added exposure to female officials in low-female representation environments, my study allows
us to learn whether high-female and low-female institutions are fundamentally different.
To clearly demonstrate how gender can still be relevant even when voters have well-informed
beliefs, I present a simple election model. This model describes the essence of Hypothesis 3. In
this model the electorate has an ideal gender composition for the board. As already discussed, this
ideal gender composition may be based on policy concerns or gender per se. Ultimately I will not
be able to distinguish the two empirically. The important point is that voters are not ignorant
about the distributions describing how candidates of either gender will behave if elected. In the
model, the previous election outcome determines the gender composition for the cohort of board
seats that will continue to serve with new members chosen in the current election. This is done
because school boards are elected in staggered elections every two years with four year terms. If the
gender composition of continuing members does not equal the electorate’s ideal composition then
the voters will have demand in the next election for one gender or the other. In the next election,
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voters seek to elect more candidates of the higher-demand gender in an attempt to achieve the
ideal composition. Potential candidates will therefore respond to this demand by entering or not
entering depending on their gender. Furthermore, candidates will successfully arbitrage to zero the
electoral opportunity in equilibrium. This means an additional female on the board will on average
move the electorate to being “too female.” This increases (decreases) demand for males (females)
which results in more (fewer) males (females) running and getting elected. In equilibrium there is
no net effect on who is elected other than through the candidates entering.
The empirical results support Hypothesis 3. However, I first show that a simple correlation
between the genders of past and current elected officials appears to support the ignorance hypoth-
esis. In fact, it is critical that the past election results be exogenously changed since unobserved
variables and serial correlation are likely to bias results in favor of the ignorance hypothesis. To do
this I use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to exogenously add an additional female or male
board member, thus changing the percent female composition of the board. Overall, the additional
female board member seems to reduce the number of females elected and increase the number of
males. This tells us that ignorance-reduction is not the primary force related to voters’ gender
decisions. Instead, voters want to elect more females when the board becomes more male, and vice
versa. Also, I find that candidates of each gender respond by their entry decisions to changes in
voters’ demands. When I control for who runs in the current election there is no estimated effect
from the additional female on the board. This demonstrates how in equilibrium candidates enter
in response to changes in demand and arbitrage to zero the electoral opportunity.
These findings are important for how we think about policy changes. For example, one may
be interested in what will happen if affirmative action policies are terminated in high-female rep-
resentation environments. If the policy has effectively decreased ignorance then we might expect
policy-based discrimination to play a larger role. Removing the affirmative action policy may in-
crease or decrease female representation relative to the affirmative action level but should also allow
voters to move closer to their ideal policy outcome. To reduce policy-based statistical discrimina-
tion, it may be useful to find ways for candidates to send better, individual-specific signals.
Section 2 presents a theoretical model of voters and candidates when the potential to reduce
ignorance-based discrimination is absent. Section 3 discusses the data and empirical strategy used.
Section 4 presents the main results, and Section 5 closes with a discussion.
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1.2 THEORETICAL MODEL
1.2.1 Environment
Suppose an electorate of voters with single-peaked preferences over the female composition of the
board. Each voter’s preferred female fraction falls in the space [0, 1]. The sequence of events is as
follows:
1. Election t − 1 determines the female fraction of the board, Gt−1, which will continue to serve
with members elected in t. Gt−1 is exogenous to the model.
2. The fraction Gt−1 generates a relative demand for males, Dmt ∈ [0, 1], in the next election t
described by Dmt = f(Gt−1). Dmt is monotonically increasing in Gt−1, and the relative demand
for females is simply Dft = 1−Dmt.
3. Potential candidates observe Dmt and decide whether to enter election t at cost c.2
4. The electorate chooses a single candidate in election t.
Model the vote share, V gj , obtained by candidate j of gender g ∈ {m, f} as
V gj =
Dgt
Ng
+ βj (1.1)
where β ≥ 0 and j is Type I Extreme Value distributed. Let Ng denote the number of candidates
of gender g. The intuition is that j’s vote share depends on both the aggregate demand for j’s
gender and how many of j’s gender run. The j term models idiosyncratic factors affecting j’s
election outcome. β serves only to scale the draw from the distribution j to the Dgt/Ng term.
From these vote shares, I can write individual j’s probability of winning as3:
P gj =
eDgt/(βNg)
NmeDmt/(βNm) +NfeDft/(βNf )
. (1.2)
The individual probabilities for all candidates of gender g are equal in expectation. This means
that the probabilities any member of gender g wins can be written as
Pg = NgP
g
j (1.3)
2I assume all candidates have the same costs. This substantially simplifies the model and does not appear to
change any of the key conclusions.
3This is the standard multinomial logit framework.
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1.2.2 Entry
Potential candidate j’s payoff if he or she chooses to run is
Πgj = γP
g
j (Nm, Nf |Dgt)− c (1.4)
Candidates are motivated by the benefits of winning, γ, but must pay cost c to run. In equilibrium,
j’s marginal benefit of running equals the marginal cost of running, resulting in the equilibrium
conditions
γPmj − c = 0 (1.5)
γP fj − c = 0 (1.6)
By substituting in Pmj and P
f
j and equating the equilibrium conditions, I can show
Nf
Nm
=
Dft
Dmt
=
1−Dmt
Dmt
(1.7)
which means the ratio of the number of female to male candidates is decreasing in the demand
for male candidates. Using Pm = NmPmj and Pf = NfP
f
j , Equation (7), and the fact that in
equilibrium Pmj = P
f
j must hold, we have
Nf
Nm
=
1−Dmt
Dmt
=
Pf
Pm
(1.8)
which shows Pm = Dmt and Pf = 1 − Dmt. This highlights what is assumed in the model. An
increase in relative demand for males (females) will result in a direct increase in the probability a
male (female) wins.
1.2.3 Comparative Statics
The model has the following comparative statics:
1. The electorate will choose males (females) more often when demand for males increases (de-
creases). As the model is constructed, an increase in female representation generates an increase
in demand for males, and vice versa. If the electorate is trying to achieve an ideal gender compo-
sition across elections, this is the pattern we expect. An increase in demand for males predicts
a decrease in females elected.
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2. Entry decisions should respond to changes in demand. Specifically, Nf/Nm declines as demand
for males increases. This relationship suggests more males and fewer females run when demand
for males increases, and vice versa.
3. Controlling for entry decisions, there should be no impact from a change in demand on the
election outcome because of equilibrium effects. That is, in equilibrium the entrants successfully
arbitrage to zero all electoral opportunities.
1.3 SCHOOLS BOARDS, DATA, AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH
In this section I discuss the institutional environment and data used. I also present the empirical
challenge and identification approach.
1.3.1 School Boards and Elections
An elected board governs each California school district. In many districts board members are
parents, teachers, or community activists rather than career politicians. Running for office is also
relatively simple as there are no filing fees or signatures required (California Ed Code Sect 5030,
35107, 72022, 72103 and E.C. Sect 201). No primaries take place so all candidates compete for
open seats in the same election. These institutional features make California school boards a good
place to observe gender preferences since we can avoid many concerns about primaries, parties,
or pre-election bargaining. For instance, in a congressional race, the candidates at the general
election have already won a primary. Furthermore, some candidates who desired to run in the
primary may not have filed because of insufficient financing or party pressure. Regarding gender,
Fox and Oxley (2003) have shown that parties select candidates based in part on gender stereotypes
about a position. This would make inference from observed behavior difficult. In the school board
elections,however, I avoid these problems since I presumably observe all those desiring to run given
a nominal running cost.
A typical school board has five or seven members. These board members are responsible to
voters for running the school district though most boards hire a superintendent to handle day-to-
day operations. Every two years, “half” the board is up for election. In a five (seven) member
district, three (four) seats will be up for election in year t and two (three) seats will be up in year
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t + 2. Each term is four years so that at any given time the board has members from the first
and last half of their terms. Most districts - and all in my sample - are open or at-large. That is,
there are no board seats associated with specific geographic areas within the school district. All
candidates run against each other and voters vote for as many as there are open seats. The top
vote getters, up to the number of open seats, are elected.
1.3.2 Data
I use California school district governing board elections from 2000 to 2007 provided in the California
Elections Data Archive (CEDA). CEDA includes election dates, districts, candidate names, ballot
designations, incumbency information, and vote tallies for most contested school district elections
in the state. As necessary and possible, I supplemented this data with results published by county
election offices. The CEDA data set contains over 19,000 (non-unique) candidates.
Using this data, I first classified each school board candidate by gender. To do this, I assigned
male or female values to each candidate based on a suffix (e.g., Jr., Sr.) or a first name that is
gender-specific with high probability. Some names were also classified based on a gender-specific
ballot designation, such as “Businesswoman” or “Housewife.” This procedure classified about 90
percent of candidates. Next, I searched the internet for information that would identify the gender
of candidates with ambiguous names. For instance, I could often determine a candidate’s gender
from news article quotes, pictures, or references in board meeting minutes. This procedure allowed
me to classify the gender of about 98 percent of candidates from the original data set.4
Each election observation in my constructed data set consists of the number of candidates of
each gender running, the number of incumbents of each gender seeking re-election, the number of
incumbents and non-incumbents of each gender elected, previous election information, and control
variables. Since I do not have district-level demographic data for each year, I use district-wide
student body demographic information from the California Department of Education as a proxy
for the voting public’s demographics.
4I was especially conservative in assuming the gender associated with a name. For example, the names “Jean” and
“Terry” were always verified. Furthermore, because most people in my sample have some public “paper trail” due to
their involvement in politics, my method is probably superior to matching names based on a probability distribution
of names. Except for names with very high gender associations, I individually verified the genders. An additional
issue is how voters perceive gender-ambiguous names. In my data if voters mistake a candidates’ gender, this will
serve to attenuate my estimates due to measurement error.
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1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for each variable. The summary statistics show several
noteworthy features of the data. First, approximately 45% of board members and 42% of candidates
are female. Also, the average number of seats up for election is 2.562. Since five-member boards
(by far the modal number) alternate between having 2 and 3 seats up for election, this suggest the
sample nearly evenly comes from each type. Figure 1.1 shows time trends for the percentage of
board members and candidates who are female. Note the relative stability of the series over time.
Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of elections by the percent of female candidates in the race.
Races are skewed toward having more male than female candidates. Note also how approximately
9% of election have less than 10% female candidates (leftmost bar) while only about 3% have an
equally low number of male candidates (rightmost bar). Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of board
gender compositions. For a five-person board, each bar corresponds to the percent of boards with
zero, one, two, three, four, or five females. What this shows is that most boards have males and
females, though more boards are all-male (leftmost bar) than are all-female (rightmost bar). This
also shows that over 75% of boards have at least two female members and 95% have at least one
female member. This further emphasizes that most electorates will have recent experience with
female members.
1.3.4 Identification Strategy
As the question is formulated, I want to estimate the effect of an exogenous change in the board
gender composition on future elections. However, exogenously varying the outcomes of the previous
election so I can estimate how candidates and voters will respond in the current election is an
empirical challenge. A simple OLS regression of the number of male or female election winners and
how many females won the previous election likely yields biased estimates due to unobservables. To
illustrate this problem, I show in Table 1.2 what happens when I estimate the effect of the number of
females elected two years prior on the number of candidates who run and win in the current election.
Columns 3 and 4 show that districts electing more women two years prior elect more women and
fewer men in the current election. While interesting, this is unsurprising and does little to answer the
causal question of how changes in the gender composition of the current board influences the current
9
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Means
Females Males
Total Elected 1.150 1.409
(0.820) (0.868)
Non-Incumbents Elected 0.506 0.635
(0.654) (0.764)
Incumbents Elected 0.645 0.774
(0.712) (0.778)
Total Candidates per Seat 0.795 1.096
(0.515) (0.612)
Incumbent Candidates per Seat 0.322 0.383
(0.310) (0.330)
Non-Incumbent Candidates per Seat 0.479 0.723
(0.470) (0.578)
Seats up for Election 2.562
(0.668)
District Enrollment (1000’s) 8.261
(10.525)
% English Language Learners (Students) 20.32
(17.68)
% Free or Reduced Price Lunch (Students) 44.42
(26.28)
% Minority (Students) 53.73
(27.66)
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Figure 1.1: Percent Female Candidates and Board Members
11
Figure 1.2: Histogram - Percent Female Candidates
Histogram shows the distribution of races in the sample by the percentage of female candidates. Sample includes
elections in years 2000 to 2007.
12
Figure 1.3: Histogram - Percent Female Members
Histogram shows the distribution of boards in the sample by the percentage of female members. Sample includes
years 2000 to 2007.
13
election.5 Taken literally, this estimate could falsely be seen as evidence for more female officeholders
reducing ignorance-based discrimination even in this high-female representation scenario. District-
level demographic and social variables such as a district’s size, ethnic distribution, rural-ness, or
political persuasion may influence both the number of candidates of a particular gender and which
gender voters elect. Furthermore, is is likely unobserved district characteristics affecting a woman’s
likelihood of winning in the past election will also affect another woman’s chances in the current
election. Therefore, to credibly estimate a causal effect I need an exogenous source of variation in
past results to isolate the variable of interest (i.e., female representation on the board).
To do this I use a regression discontinuity design. Essentially, I compare situations where one
female closely defeats a male and where one female closely loses to a male in the previous election.
In California, board members are elected to four-year, staggered terms on the first Tuesday of
November6. For instance, in year Y 1 three members are elected and in year Y 3 two members are
elected.7 In year Y 5 the cohort of seats filled in year Y 1 are again up for election. This staggering
allows me to exploit quasi-random variation in the board membership caused during the Y1 election
to estimate effects on candidate behavior and election outcomes in Y3. Since the Y1 cohort will
remain on the board two years past the Y3 election, it is reasonable to assume variation from the Y1
election is key information that Y3 candidates and voters use when considering election prospects.
To implement this approach, I construct a “running variable” for each election. The running
variable is the vote difference between the female and male who were closest in vote percentages
to each other but on opposite sides of the winning threshold. If three seats are open, the winning
threshold is between the third and fourth highest candidates when ranked from most to least votes.
I subtract from the female’s vote percentage the male’s vote percentage. If the male won, the
running variable is negative. If the female won, it is positive. The distribution of the running
variable used in my analysis is shown in Figure 1.4. Notice that most observations are near the
zero point, and there are very few observations beyond a difference of twenty.
The discontinuity I use to identify my regressions is at the point where the running variable
is zero. This is where a female just barely defeats a male, or vice versa. At this zero point I can
5Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.2 show a similar (yet insignificant) pattern for candidate entry: women winning in
the past increases (decreases) the number of women (men) currently running.
6Some districts have adopted more complicated arrangements and hold elections at other times of the year. These
districts are not included in the sample.
7Most districts (94.8% of sample) have five members, but some have seven.
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Table 1.2: Naive Effect of Females Winning on Gender of Candidates and Winners in Next Election
Dependent Variable Number Cand. Running Number Elected
With Controls Females Males Females Males
Number of Fem. Win. Previous 0.048 -0.087 0.055* -0.055*
(0.049) (0.054) (0.032) (0.032)
No. Enrolled Students (1000’s) 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pct. English Learners 0.006 -0.011** 0.007*** -0.007***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Pct. Free or Reduced Lunch 0.003 0.004 -0.003** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Pct. Minority -0.006 0.005 -0.004** 0.004**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Seats Up for Election 0.664*** 0.942*** 0.432*** 0.568***
(0.066) (0.070) (0.039) (0.039)
No. Observations 1468 1468 1468 1468
Standard errors clustered by district are shown in parenthesis. (***) for 1%, (**) for 5%, and (*) for 10% significance.
Columns show results from regressing the number of female and male candidates (Columns 1 and 2) and the number
of females and males elected (Columns 3 and 4) on the number of females elected in the previous election. This
represents the naive approach to estimating the effect of past females winning on future election behavior.
15
Figure 1.4: Distribution of Running Variable in Sample
The running variable is the female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side
of the winning threshold in the previous election. At 0, the running variable is interpreted as a male and female
candidate tying. Positive (negative) values indicate a female (male) defeated a male (female).
16
estimate how the outcomes of interest two years later are affected. A small change in the vote
tally near this point creates a binary change in whether a male or female wins and takes office.
This creates the exogenous variation in the board composition needed to estimate causal effects.
The intuition for this identification strategy is that very close elections are essentially random in
whether a male or female wins, but the consequences are dramatic. The notion of using close
elections to generate random variation is employed by DiNardo and Lee (2004), Lee (2008), Rehavi
(2007), and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009).
To produce estimates and standard errors, I use the following regression:
Yit = αMjt−2 + T (M) +X
′
jtγ + jt (1.9)
where Yit is the outcome of interest, Mjt−2 indicates if the female won the close election two years
prior, T (M) represents flexible polynomials fit separately to the running variable on each side of
the discontinuity, and Xjt is a set of election and district controls and an intercept. The coefficient
α is the main value of interest. The estimate of α is the average effect on the outcome of interest
of a woman winning an election two years prior and thus sitting on the board.
In practice I consider several bandwidths. The bandwidth indicates how much of the data on
each side of the discontinuity is included in the sample. The main results include all observations
where the running variable is between -25 and 25, and I fit quadratic polynomials to the running
variable on each side of the discontinuity. I also vary the degree of this polynomial and also the
bandwidth. This adjusts how much observations far from the discontinuity are allowed to influence
the estimates.
Before presenting results, it is important to check the key identifying assumption of the regres-
sion discontinuity approach. Since we assume observations near the discontinuity are randomly
assigned to either side, there should be no difference in other variables near this discontinuity.
Table 1.3 shows that for all the control variables this holds.
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1.4 MAIN RESULTS
I now estimate whether an additional female on the board increases, decreases, or has zero effect
on the number of females chosen in the current election. This will indicate which hypothesis
is consistent with the data. An increase indicates the added exposure reduces voter ignorance
(Hypothesis 1). A zero effect points to gender indifference (Hypothesis 2). A decrease suggests
demand has shifted toward males because of the increase in females on the board (Hypothesis 3).
This last hypothesis is modeled by the theory presented in Section 2.
As already mentioned, I find evidence from electoral outcomes supporting this third hypothesis.
Therefore, I also proceed to see if candidates’ entry decisions also are in line with my model.
According to the model, Nf/Nm will decrease as demand for males increases. That is, an additional
female exogenously added to the board will increase demand for males and will therefore decrease
Nf/Nm. Estimates confirm this relationship. Finally, I test a key prediction of the model. The
model predicts when the system is in equilibrium, candidates will arbitrage to zero any electoral
opportunity. Empirically, if this is the case, we expect an additional female to have no effect on the
genders of those elected once we control in the regressions for which types of candidates enter the
race. Also, there should be no effect of a female winning in the past on an individual’s probability
of winning in equilibrium. This is indeed what I find.
These empirical results broadly support the hypothesis that voters have gender preferences
but are not ignorant about candidates’ expected behavior. Yet there is an important caveat: the
impacts mostly fall on non-incumbents. The likely reason for this is that the election gender effects
are marginal influences on potential candidates’ decisions. Suppose incumbent candidates, who
are highly likely to win re-election, make their decisions to run first. Then, once incumbents have
decided whether to run, potential non-incumbent candidates decide. This means the marginal,
non-incumbent candidates are the ones most affected by changes in gender composition.
1.4.1 Past Elections and Election Outcomes
In the main election outcome estimates, I examine the effect of past elections on six different
outcome variables. First, the total number of females elected. Second, the number of non-incumbent
females elected. Third, the number of female incumbents elected. The fourth, fifth, and sixth
outcome variables are simply the number of total, non-incumbent, and incumbent males elected.
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Figures 1.5 to 1.7 illustrate the discontinuities generated in the outcome variable (Yit) at the
point where a female barely defeated a male. I plot local averages and a simple quadratic fit on
both sides of the discontinuity at zero. The horizontal axis, “Female Minus Male Vote,” plots
the difference in vote percentages of the lowest winning female and highest losing male candidate
in the previous election, or vice versa. Thus, positive values indicate a female win and negative
value indicate a male win. A movement from just left to just right of the zero point crosses the
discontinuity, adding a female to the board in place of a male. Points near each side of zero
represent extremely close elections while points at the left and right extremes are uncompetitive
races between a male and female. Near the discontinuity we can see how the predicted fits “jump.”
This visually represents the effect of interest.
Figure 1.5 displays the effect of a female winning a close election two years prior on the number
of males and females elected in the current election. In the top panel the fitted quadratics suggest
an upward jump in the number of males elected when a female wins. The bottom panel indicates a
drop in the number of females under the same conditions. Table 1.4, Panel A, presents regression
estimates corresponding to the bottom plot in Figure 1.5 and estimates the size and significance of
the discontinuity for females. The point estimates in Table 1.5, Panel A, show a positive impact on
the number of males elected due to an increase in the female composition of the board. However,
the estimates are not quite significant at conventional levels for the widest bandwidth. In part,
this may be because observations far from the discontinuity are allowed to exert influence on the
estimates. As Figure 1.4 showed, there are actually few observations far from the discontinuity
which means there may be high variance in these observations. But in Table 1.4, Panel A, Columns
3 to 10, I trim these few observations to focus on only those close to the discontinuity. I vary
the bandwidths between [-10,10], [-5,5], and [-3,3] and use quadratic and linear fits (T (M) in the
regression equation). These estimates are similar in direction to those in Columns 1 and 2 but
statistically significant. In Table 1.5, Panel A, I do the same for males elected and also find much
stronger estimates. Admittedly, the visual discontinuities in Figure 1.5 are not overwhelmingly
clear. But, it is suggestive that the effect is in line with Hypothesis 3 and the Table 1.4 and 1.5
estimates support this. At minimum these results are evidence against Hypothesis 1 and weak
evidence for Hypothesis 3.
20
Figure 1.5: Total Number Elected by Gender
Each graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the running variable. The running variable is
the female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A quadratic polynomial fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close
races. A move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election.
Thus, the discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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Figure 1.6 shows a similar graph for only non-incumbents. The bottom plot shows a substantial
discontinuity in the number of non-incumbent females elected. Table 1.4, Panel B, estimates this
as a highly significant effect. The election of a female in year t − 2 reduces the number of non-
incumbent females elected in t by about 0.22. This drop is 19% of the average total number of
females elected and 43% of the average number of non-incumbent females elected. This means that
most of the impact of an increase in female board composition falls on non-incumbent females.
Conversely, the benefits of a male winning also go to the non-incumbent females.
While, as already discussed above, it appears the overall number of males elected increases
when a female is added to the board, Table 1.5, Panels B and C, shows this effect is distributed
between incumbent and non-incumbent male candidates. Furthermore, incumbent females (Table
1.4, Panel C) appear to also benefit somewhat. Mechanically, all the marginal reduction for non-
incumbent females elected must be accounted for with positive values elsewhere. It appears much
of the positive benefit goes to males though some goes to incumbent females. While these estimates
are statistically insignificant, we know they together mirror the negative effect on non-incumbent
females. It is reasonable to believe there is simply not enough power to precisely estimate each
value separately. However, this also suggests gender may be functioning in an additional way not
included in the model. It appears an additional female member causes voters to shift partially to all
incumbents and also to males. This extra effect remains a puzzle. For this reason I assert the data
is consistent with the model but also note there may be additional influences future researchers
may want to consider. What is clear is the electorates appear to oscillate in large part around an
ideal gender composition. When female representation increases, on average more males are chosen
to balance this out. When male representation increases, the opposite happens.
1.4.2 Past Elections and Candidate Behavior
Having shown election results tend to be in line with the Hypothesis 3, I can now investigate whether
candidates behave as described by the theoretical model. I estimate the impact of a female winning
two years prior on candidate entry behavior. Figure 1.8 illustrates the discontinuities in the ratio
of female to male candidates for all candidates and only non-incumbent candidates. Table 1.6
presents estimates of the effect. The estimates are in line with a key relationship posited by the
model. As demand for males increases (due to an increase in female representation), the ratio
Nf/Nm decreases. This effect falls completely on non-incumbent candidates (Table 1.6, Panel B)
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Figure 1.6: Non-Incumbents Elected by Gender
Each graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the running variable. The running variable is
the female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A quadratic polynomial fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close
races. A move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election.
Thus, the discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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Figure 1.7: Incumbents Elected by Gender
Each graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the running variable. The running variable is
the female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A quadratic polynomial fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close
races. A move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election.
Thus, the discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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rather than incumbent candidates (Table 1.6, Panel C).
Figure 1.9 alternately shows the discontinuities for the total number of male and female candi-
dates who run. Clear jumps are visible: a female winning increases (decreases) the total number of
males (females) who run. Tables 1.7 and 1.8 present estimates of this effect. From Table 1.7, Panel
A, a female winning decreases the number of females who run by 0.233, or -29% of the average
number running. From Table 1.8, Panel A, the effect on male candidates is an increase of 0.166, or
15% of the average number running.
In Tables 1.7 and 1.8, Panels B, estimates indicate this entry effect is mostly due to non-
incumbents rather than incumbents changing their behavior. For non-incumbent females, the
results are highly significant and robust. For non-incumbent males the results fall short of sig-
nificance, though the point estimate is large relative to that for incumbent males and, as before,
trimming extreme observations improves precision. Overall the entry results all comport with the
model where candidates of both genders systematically respond to changes in demand.
1.4.3 Conditional Election Results
While Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show the overall impact of a previous female winner on who gets elected,
the model says that in equilibrium the candidates arbitrage to zero any remaining electoral oppor-
tunity. Therefore, once I control for who runs for office there should be no effect on the election
outcome. Table 1.9 shows estimates of the effect of adding a female to the board on election
outcomes while controlling for the number of male incumbents, female incumbents, male non-
incumbents, female non-incumbents, seats up for election, and district controls. In particular, I
focus on non-incumbent females since this is the group for which I found a highly significant effect
on election outcomes. As implied by the theoretical model, the estimated discontinuity disappears.
This suggests that in fact candidates systematically respond to changes in demand to the point of
arbitraging to zero any electoral opportunity. The lack of an estimated discontinuity in Table 1.9
is interpreted as a lack of any remaining electoral benefits that can be captured through candidate
entry.
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Figure 1.8: Ratio of Female to Male Candidates
Each graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the running variable. The running variable is
the female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A quadratic polynomial fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close
races. A move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election.
Thus, the discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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Figure 1.9: Total Number Running by Gender
Each graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the running variable. The running variable is
the female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A quadratic polynomial fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close
races. A move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election.
Thus, the discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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Figure 1.10: Non-Incumbents Running by Gender
Each graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the running variable. The running variable is
the female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A quadratic polynomial fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close
races. A move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election.
Thus, the discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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Figure 1.11: Incumbents Running by Gender
Each graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the running variable. The running variable is
the female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A quadratic polynomial fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close
races. A move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election.
Thus, the discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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Table 1.9: Election Results Conditional on Candidate Entry
Dependent Variable #. Elected # Non-Inc Elected
Females Females Females Females
Discontinuity at 0 0.042 -0.027 -0.036 -0.053
(0.068) (0.096) (0.060) (0.066)
No. Female Non-Inc Running 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.265*** 0.333***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016)
No. Male Non-Inc Running -0.130*** -0.096***
(0.014) (0.012)
No. Female Inc Running 0.428*** -0.311***
(0.030) (0.026)
No. Male Inc Running -0.305*** -0.279***
(0.028) (0.026)
Polynomial Fit Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 997 997 997 997
Standard errors clustered by district are shown in parenthesis. (***) for 1%, (**) for 5%, and (*) for 10% significance.
Table shows the effects of past election outcomes, conditioning on who entered the race. All specifications include
a full set of controls, including number of open seats, pct. minority, pct. English learners, pct. free/reduced lunch,
and district enrollment size.
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A different approach suggested by the model is to look at the effects on individual probabilities
of winning. According to the model, in equilibrium the effect of a female winning in the past on
any individual candidate’s probability of winning should be zero. I check this by estimating linear
probability and Probit models to see if a female winning in the past affects the outcome. Results are
not shown, but as expected there is no effect for any type of candidate (i.e., females, non-incumbent
females, etc.). In fact, estimates are not only statistically zero but often the point estimates are
very small in magnitude. This provides further evidence for Hypothesis 3.
Taking all the major findings together, it seems clear gender still matters in this environment of
high-female representation. Patterns in the data point to electorates trying to maintain a certain
gender composition on the board rather than having ignorance reduced through experience. Thus
in some cycles males are marginally favored and in others females are. Given this environment,
candidates appear to rationally enter races.
1.4.4 Differences Between Incumbents and Non-Incumbents
As already mentioned, most of the effects appear to fall on non-incumbents. Indeed, non-incumbent
candidate entry seems highly sensitive to changes in gender demand while incumbents are not
affected. I suggest this is because the marginal candidates are typically non-incumbents since
incumbents may choose to run first. Incumbents are highly likely to win re-election and so non-
incumbents will factor into their chances of winning whether an incumbent is running. Here I
present evidence for this assertion.
Table 1.10 shows that incumbents are much more sensitive to whether a male or female won
in the previous election than incumbents are. The reason for this may be that the “incumbency
effect” dominates any gender-related calculations by the candidates. That is, incumbents who run
may be highly likely to win and this overwhelms most other concerns. Table 1.10, Columns 1 to 4,
directly shows that both male and female incumbents win re-election with high frequency and this
effect dominates any estimated effect at the discontinuity.
36
T
ab
le
1.
10
:
C
om
pa
ri
ng
In
cu
m
be
nt
vs
.
N
on
-I
nc
um
be
nt
s
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e
N
um
.
In
c.
E
le
ct
ed
W
it
h
C
on
tr
ol
s
Fe
m
al
e
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
M
al
e
N
um
.
Fe
m
al
e
In
c.
R
un
ni
ng
0.
77
8*
**
0.
77
7*
**
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
21
)
N
um
.
M
al
e
In
cu
m
be
nt
s
R
un
ni
ng
0.
75
2*
**
0.
75
1*
**
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
21
)
D
is
co
nt
in
ui
ty
at
0
0.
03
6
-0
.0
08
0.
08
9
0.
01
8
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
62
)
P
ol
yn
om
ia
l
F
it
L
in
ea
r
L
in
ea
r
Q
ua
dr
at
ic
Q
ua
dr
at
ic
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o.
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
99
7
99
7
99
7
99
7
W
it
h
ou
t
C
on
tr
ol
s
N
o.
Fe
m
al
e
In
c.
R
un
ni
ng
0.
77
7*
**
0.
77
7*
**
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
21
)
N
o.
M
al
e
In
cu
m
be
nt
s
R
un
ni
ng
0.
75
6*
**
0.
75
6*
**
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
21
)
D
is
co
nt
in
ui
ty
at
0
0.
02
9
-0
.0
12
0.
07
8
0.
01
8
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
62
)
P
ol
yn
om
ia
l
F
it
L
in
ea
r
L
in
ea
r
Q
ua
dr
at
ic
Q
ua
dr
at
ic
C
on
tr
ol
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o.
of
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
99
7
99
7
99
7
99
7
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
d
is
tr
ic
t
sh
ow
n
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
.
(*
*
*
)
fo
r
1
%
,
(*
*
)
fo
r
5
%
,
a
n
d
(*
)
fo
r
1
0
%
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
.
37
1.5 CONCLUSION
The empirical results presented show that environments where those choosing leaders have accurate
beliefs about a potential leader’s performance are very different from those where biases or ignorance
about candidates predominate. On California school boards, females represent a large share of
members, and voters are likely to be quite familiar with how both male and female candidates will
govern on average. The evidence points to electorates trying to systematically maintain an ideal
board gender composition. Candidates’ entry decisions reveal rational responses to the electorate’s
desires. This is in contrast to studies in low-female representation environments where added
exposure to female leadership reduces ignorance and therefore has the opposite net effect I find.
This also raises some unresolved questions. First, the nature of voters’ preferences for a given
gender composition remain unclear. Hypothesis 3 holds that gender matters to voters, yet it does
not suggest the source of such preferences. Voters may have a desired policy outcome, will make
accurate gender-based inferences about how each candidate will govern, and will choose candidates
to achieve the desired policy. Or, voters may have preferences over gender per se. For example,
voters could have taste-based prejudices or affinities for a certain gender. Regardless of whether
voters care about policy or gender per se, both motivations will generate similar patterns in my
data. It is reasonable to believe both play a role. Further study will be needed to parse-out the
relative importance of each piece.
There is also the issue of candidate motivations. I assumed in the model candidates are moti-
vated by the benefits of winning. These benefits for some candidates may entail reaping “the spoils
of office” or the opportunity to implement preferred policy. But at least some candidates may also
care about gender per se. If candidates enter to increase their gender’s representation, entry would
follow the pattern found in the data. This pattern is of course also consistent with candidates
caring about winning. As with the question of the electorate’s motivations, data limitations do not
allow me to answer this question.
What the main findings do, however, show is that the specific environment matters. This means
policy makers must consider carefully what types of discrimination are or are not at work when
changing affirmative action policies. For example, if discrimination is primarily policy-based in a
high-female representation environment, then removing affirmative action quotas while increasing
candidate-specific information may be a reasonable approach which allows voters to achieve their op-
timal policy. While understandably most affirmative action research pertains to low-representation
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situations, it will become increasingly important to understand how people behave once high-
representation is achieved.
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2.0 CAN BOARD DIVERSITY IMPROVE THE DELIVERY OF
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES?
2.1 INTRODUCTION
How corporate board diversity affects firm performance is extensively discussed in the business
management and organizational behavior literature. Several theories seek to explain how diversity
might positively affect organizational performance while other theories posit a negative diversity
effect. Empirical findings are also mixed concerning the role of board diversity on such outcomes
as a firm’s share price and profitability (Smith et al. 2006). Concerning board gender diversity,
studies from various nations exist yet do not reach a clear consensus (see Smith et al. 2006; Carter
et al. 2010; Shrader 1997; Kochan 2003; Adler 2001; DuRietz and Henrekson 2000; Rose 2004). For
good reasons, this literature has primarily focused on private-sector firm performance. I however
study whether governing board gender diversity matters in the performance of an important public
organization, namely, school districts. I estimate how gender diversity on California school districts’
governing boards affects academic performance. This provides some of the first evidence that board
gender diversity can influence objective measures of performance in the public sector.
Two dominant theories propose how governing board diversity may improve organizational
performance. While typically applied to corporate boards, each is useful for considering gender
diversity on school boards. These theories, presented throughout the literature, are here referred to
as the “resource dependent” and “agency” theories. The resource dependent theory, in the present
context, posits that having a mixture of male and female board members increases the quantity
of unique information and thus improves strategic decision making. That is, diversity offers new
perspectives and fosters communication on topics not frequently addressed (Page 2007; Carter et
al. 2010; Smith et al. 2006; Erhardt et al. 2003). For example, in a school district, female members
who are mothers or teachers may understand specific issues better than the average male member.
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This input may affect board policies and ultimately improve the delivery of educational services.
The agency theory says that diversity helps a board in its monitoring role by increasing its
independence. A school board serves as an agent of the public and is responsible for monitoring
district operations. Diversity of members may reduce the possibility the board becomes beholden
to the superintendent, teachers’ unions, corporations, or any segment of voters. Furthermore,
the board’s monitoring capabilities may be improved if certain members are able to form better
relationships with certain school employees. This may increase the likelihood the board succeeds
in implementing its policies.
However, some authors state that homogeneity will produce better outcomes (Hambrick et al.
1996; Smith et al. 2006). For example, it is possible a board could be torn by infighting among
diverse members and consequently fail to implement first-best policies. Or, factions on the board
might create poor relationships within the schools and hamper the delivery of quality education.
School boards with reputations for infighting may also be unable to hire competent superintendents
and teachers. Given that a priori this theory is as plausible as those implying positive effects on
educational outcomes, I empirically estimate whether increasing gender diversity on a school board
helps to improve academic performance. Specifically, the main results show the impact on key
academic outcomes of adding an additional female to the school board.
When estimating whether board gender diversity causally influences an organization’s per-
formance, potential unobserved variables and endogeneity are a chief concern. This issue is well
documented in the corporate governance literature, and some studies seek a cleaver solution (Smith
et al. 2006; Carter et al. 2010). With school boards, this also is a major concern. District-specific
unobserved variables which are simultaneously correlated with a district’s propensity to choose
female board members and a district’s academic performance will bias estimates. Thus, finding a
correlation between gender diversity and academic performance will offer little insight into whether
gender diversity actual affects academic outcomes.
To address this causality problem, I employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design. By com-
paring situations where a female barely defeated a male, and vice versa, in school board elections,
I can quasi-exogenously add either a female or male to the board. This exogenous change in the
number of female board members allows for causal estimates of the effect on academic performance.
The intuition for the RD approach is that the outcome of very close elections between a male and
female candidate are “as good as random” because in such cases idiosyncratic factors influence a
small number of decisive votes. Such an approach has been used by DiNardo and Lee (2004), Lee
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(2008), Rehavi (2007), and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009).
Using the RD design, I estimate the effect of increasing the number of female board members on a
district’s academic performance. I consider the effect on whether a district achieves Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) within the next three years and on the total change in the Academic Performance
Index (API) over three years.1 For both measures of performance, I find evidence that increasing
the female board composition increases a district’s academic performance on average for districts
that are currently failing to make AYP. While the data also suggests performance increases over a
shorter time frame, these estimates are of smaller magnitude and less significant. But, it appears
performance steadily improves each year which is reasonable given that it may take several years
for board policies to be implemented. I find no diversity effect for districts currently achieving
AYP. Together, this suggests that times of crises (i.e. a district failing in its education mission)
may be when diversity is most valuable.
Having shown an average net benefit of gender diversity on school boards, I would like to know
whether the data supports either the resource dependent or agency theory. Unfortunately, I cannot
conclusively distinguish the two. However, I can observe one outcome related to the agency theory.
Using the same RD approach I find an increase in the number of female board members decreases
the probability the district superintendent separates from the position in the districts that were
failing AYP. Unfortunately, the data does not reveal the reason for the separation (i.e. “firing” or
voluntary). However, this does point to gender differences in a board’s monitoring capacity. As
an agent of the public, the board must manage school personnel, most notably the superintendent.
Apparently having more females on the board reduces the likelihood either party chooses to end
the superintendent’s tenure. This may partially explain the performance improvements if retaining
a superintendent ultimately is better than hiring a new executive and undergoing the costs of
such a transition. However, this effect on superintendent separations could also be a proxy for
the general quality of board-staff relationships. If there is an acrimonious air about the board,
not only is the superintendent likely to leave but the board will have difficulty working well with
other staff to implement beneficial reforms. While I cannot identify exactly how the variation in
superintendent separations relates to academic outcomes, it does appear female and male board
members differ in how they choose to exercise their monitoring role. This comports with other
evidence finding male and female officeholders tend to make different decisions (Thomas 1991;
1By looking at performance measures over several years I mitigate the risk of simply finding spurious correlation
in a single year.
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Berkman and O’Connor 1993; Vega and Firestone 1995; Thomas and Welch 2001; Rehavi 2007;
Clots-Figueras 2006; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004).
Section 2 discusses California school districts, boards, and superintendents. I also explain
the data construction and provide some basic summary statistics. In Section 3 I describe the
identification strategy. Section 4 presents the main results, and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS, BOARDS, AND SUPERINTENDENTS
2.2.1 Organizational Features
An elected board governs each California school district and within State and Federal guidelines has
substantial latitude in how it provides educational services. Typically a board has five members,
though some have more. Seats are usually “at-large”, meaning members do not represent a specific
area of the district but instead are chosen by all voters in the jurisdiction.2 Board members are
elected to four-year terms in elections staggered every two years. This way, some members of the
board are always in the first half of their term and some are in the second half. There are no
term limits, primaries, or political parties. Many if not most board members are simply parents,
teachers, or community members. In “at large” elections all candidates appear on the same ballot.
Voters can choose up to N candidates, where N is the number of open board seats. When candidates
are ranked by their vote tally, the top N vote-getters are elected to the board. In a five-member
district, three seats will be filled in election year t and two seats will be filled in election year t+ 2.
As elected officials, board members are accountable to voters for the district’s academic perfor-
mance as well as the district’s finances, personnel, facilities, curriculum, disciplinary policies, etc.
Some boards choose to be heavily involved in management issues while others will delegate much
of this work. In practice, school boards hire an executive, or superintendent, to run the day-to-day
operations of the district. This is typically one of the most crucial decisions a board will make. The
relationship between the board and superintendent can be a key factor in how smoothly district
operations run.
As an agent elected by the public, the board expects the superintendent to achieve a certain level
of performance. While many performance measures are intangible, a key performance indicator is
2Typically the large urban districts have larger boards and geographic member districts. These represent a small
number of all districts and are not included in my sample.
43
academic achievement. In California during the sample period, the top-level measure of a district’s
performance was whether it achieved Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP).3 As the chief executive,
the superintendent is likely to be judged in part by this performance measure.
Usually each summer, the board decides to renew or not renew the current superintendent’s
contract. However, superintendents also may choose to retire or leave for other positions (usually
at a different district). Consequently the decision to separate is jointly determined. Some superin-
tendents may leave for idiosyncratic reasons mostly unrelated to the current position (e.g. spouse
takes a job in a different area). Many will seek better positions. Some will be unceremoniously
“fired.” Still others will be “asked to resign” or choose to resign due to the employment relationship
no longer being desired by one or both parties.
2.2.2 Data
The analysis relies on several data sources. Academic performance data in each district for the
sample years is provided by the California Department of Education (CDE). This data reports
on the district-level whether AYP is achieved in a given year as well as a district’s Academic
Performance Index (API) score. This allows me to not only see if adequate performance was
achieved in a given year but how much the key performance measure changed over time.
I also use California school district governing board elections from 1999 to 2007 provided in
the California Elections Data Archive (CEDA) to determine who won election and therefore served
on the board. CEDA includes election dates, districts, candidate names, ballot designations, in-
cumbency information, and vote tallies for most contested school district elections in the state.
This election data provides information essential to my identification strategy. As necessary and
possible, I supplemented the CEDA with results published by county election offices. Using this
data, I first classified each school board candidate by gender. To do this, I assigned male or female
values to each person based on a suffix (e.g. Jr., Sr.) or a first name that is gender-specific with
high probability. Some candidate names were also classified based on a gender-specific ballot des-
ignation, such as “Businesswoman” or “Housewife.” This procedure classified about 90 percent of
individuals. Next, I searched the internet for information that would identify the gender of those
with ambiguous names. For instance, I could often determine a person’s gender from news article
quotes, pictures, or references in board meeting minutes. This procedure allowed me to classify the
3AYP is a measure that of academic achievement given to each school district. A formula incorporating past and
current academic performance is used to determine if a district, school, or the state as a whole achieves AYP.
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gender of about 98 percent of persons from the original data set.4
District superintendent information was collected from annual editions of the California School
Directory published by the California Department of Education (CDE). By observing consecutive
years, I constructed a panel of information about whether a superintendent was hired or separated
in a given year. As with the board members, I then classified each superintendent by his or her
gender.
Each annual, district observation contains AYP and API information, the board’s current gender
composition, the most recent election information, information on the superintendent, and district
controls. District control variables include district size, revenue per average daily attendance, and
the percent of students who are English learners, free and reduced price lunch recipients, and
minorities.
Table 2.1 provides information about the sample. About 69% of superintendents are male and
about 47% of board members are female. Over the sample period the board gender composition
has remained steady, as has the percentage of candidates who are female. It should be noted that
unlike most other elected bodies in the United States (and worldwide), California school boards
have an extremely high proportion of females - nearly reaching parity. Table 2.1 also shows that
in the sample 54.9% of districts failed to make AYP. While this may appear especially high, it is
consistent with passing rates published on the CDE web site. The table also shows there is little
difference in superintendent gender percentages between districts making and failing AYP.
2.3 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
The key challenge in estimating the effect of board member characteristics (i.e. gender) on district
performance is that many district-specific, unobserved variables may be correlated with both the
independent and dependent variables.5 A district prone to elect a high number of females may
4I was especially conservative in assuming the gender associated with a name. For example, the names “Jean”
and “Terry” were always verified. Furthermore, because most people in my sample have some public “paper trail”
due to their involvement in politics or school administration, my method is probably superior to matching names
based on a probability distribution of names. Except for names with very high gender associations, I individually
verified the genders.
5This is just as much a problem with data in a corporate situation. Factors that make a firm likely to have more
female board members are also likely to influence other corporate decisions that could affect profitability.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Key Variables Mean
% of Districts with Male Superintendent 68.76
(46.4)
% of Board that is Female 47.04
(21.6)
% if Districts Failing AYP 54.91
(49.8)
% of Failing with Male Superintendent 69.67
(46.0)
% of Passing with Male Superintendents 67.63
(46.8)
API for Passing Districts 776.1
(90.4)
API for Failing Districts 708.4
(71.1)
Controls
District Enrollment (1000’s) 9.619
(10.51)
% English Language Learner 22.31
(17.83)
% Free and Reduced Lunch 45.07
(26.56)
% Minority 58.78
(27.04)
% Revenue per ADA ($) 8056
(2747)
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also be in a higher income area which likely also affects academic performance. Such a situation
would generate correlation between board gender composition and academic performance even if
the board members’ genders did not causally influence academic performance.
To determine whether board gender composition causally affects academic performance, I need
a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the number of males and females sitting on the school
board. To do this I use a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Essentially, I compare school board
elections where a female closely defeats a male and where a female closely loses to a male in the
most recent election. The winner will of course serve on the school board.
In California, board members are elected to four-year, staggered terms on the first Tuesday
of November6. For instance, in year t three members are elected and in year t + 2 two members
are elected.7 In year t + 4 the cohort of seats filled in year t are again up for election. After the
November election, board members take office in December. These members will participate in
district decisions for four years.
I use quasi-random outcomes between male and female candidates in the board elections to
generate variation in the gender composition of the board members. The intuition is that very
close elections between the lowest winning female (male) and highest losing male (female) is “as
good as random.” On election day numerous idiosyncratic factors can cause a very close election
to go one way or the other. This randomness allows me to estimate the causal effect of having an
additional male or female on the board.
To implement the RD approach, I construct a “forcing variable” for each election. The forcing
variable is the vote difference between the female and male who were closest in vote percentages
to each other but on opposite sides of the winning threshold. If three seats are open, the winning
threshold is between the third and fourth highest candidates when ranked from most to least votes.
For the closest male/female pair across the winning threshold, I subtract from the female’s vote
percentage the vote percentage of the male. Consequently, the forcing variable is positive if the
female won and negative if the male won. A forcing variable of zero would indicate the male and
female tied. The distribution of the forcing variable used in my analysis is shown in Figure 2.1.
Notice that most observations are around the zero point and there are relatively few observations
beyond a difference of ten. Since the estimate will consider what happens when we switch from just
below to just above where the forcing variable equals zero, it is important to have a large number
6Some districts have adopted more complicated arrangements and hold elections at other times of the year. These
districts are not included in the sample.
7Most districts have five members, but some have seven.
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of observations here.
As one moves across the zero point, a small change in the vote tally creates a sharp, binary
change in whether a male or female wins and serves on the board. The intuition for this identification
strategy is that very close elections are essentially random in whether a male or female wins but the
consequences are dramatic. This approach of using close elections to generate random variation is
employed by DiNardo and Lee (2004), Lee (2008), Rehavi (2007), and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009).
To produce estimates and standard errors, I use the following regression:
Yit = βMjt−1 + T (M) +X
′
jtγ + jt (2.1)
where Yit is the outcome of interest, Mjt−1 indicates if the female won the most recent close
election, T (M) represents flexible polynomials fit separately to the forcing variable on each side
of the discontinuity, and Xjt is a set of district controls and an intercept. The coefficient β is the
main value of interest. The estimate of β is the average effect on the outcome of interest of a
woman relative to a man sitting on the board . In estimating β, I consider several bandwidths.
The bandwidth indicates how much of the data on each side of the discontinuity is included in
the sample. Since there are very few observations in the extremes, these points can vary wildly
and may have undue influence on the estimates. Consequently I show estimates using a range of
bandwidths which serve to demonstrate the overall robustness of the results.
Before presenting my findings, it is important to check the key identifying assumption of the
RD approach. Since RD assumes observations near the discontinuity are randomly assigned to
either side, there should be no correlation between the discontinuity and other variables. Table 2.2
shows that for all the control variables this holds (Col. 3- 6). Furthermore, the table shows that
the assumed exogenous change in board gender composition has no effect on whether the district
currently makes AYP, which might also indicate selection problems (Col. 1-2).
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Forcing Variable
The forcing variable is the female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side
of the winning threshold in the previous election. At 0, the forcing variable is interpreted as a male and female
candidate tying. Positive (negative) values indicate a female (male) defeated a male (female).
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2.4 RESULTS
2.4.1 Academic Performance
Estimates show that the gender composition of the school board can have a substantial impact on
some districts’ medium-run academic performance. I find that on average for districts currently
failing to make AYP, an additional female on the school board helps to improve performance over the
next three years. For districts already making AYP, I find no significant impacts on performance.
Specifically, I measure the following outcomes for failing districts: whether the district achieves
AYP within the next three years and the total API change over the next three years.
Table 2.3 presents estimates of the effect increasing the number of females on the school board
has on whether the district makes AYP within the next three years. Note the sample only includes
districts that were failing AYP. Point estimates show that an additional female on the school board
increases by about 12 to 25% the likelihood a district makes AYP in the next three years. This
table shows a range of bandwidth and estimates with and without controls. Furthermore, I also
vary the trend type fit through the forcing variable. While the point estimates are all positive,
the magnitudes and significance levels vary. Since the outcome is discrete, it is a blunt measure
and will not pick up improvements that do not change the overall AYP standing. This will make
it more difficult to find an effect. However, the estimates do suggest an additional female board
member has a positive average marginal effect on a district’s attempt to return to good standing.
In Figure 2.2 the estimated effect is illustrated. The horizontal axis, plots the forcing variable. The
vertical axis plots whether the district achieved AYP within three years. Each point plots a local
average of the observations, and I fit a linear trend through the data. Moving from left to right of
zero on the x-axis means switching from a male to female serving on the board. A slight upward
jump in the likelihood the district achieves AYP within the next three years may be discernible,
but it is not immediately apparent.
Though AYP is of great importance, some districts may improve their API score but not actually
make AYP. For this reason, I consider a continuous rather than discrete measure of performance.
In Tables 2.4, I present estimates showing the effect of an additional female serving on the school
board on the total API change over three years. Not only will this allow me to observe API changes
not resulting in a discrete change in the AYP state, but considering three years will reduce the
51
Figure 2.2: Makes AYP within 3 Years
Graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the forcing variable. The forcing variable is the
female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A linear trend fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close races. A
move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election. Thus, the
discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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possibility I pick up a statistical anomaly. Table 2.4 shows that an extra female on the board
increases the total API gain over three years by about 7 to 17 API points. This represents an
increase of about one-third to three-fourths of a standard deviation in the average API change in
those three years. Results are significant and robust to changes in bandwidth and controls. This
effect is shown graphically in Figure 2.3. This continuous measure of performance is strong evidence
of a positive, average impact of female members on performance.
Overall, the two estimates agree qualitatively. Having an additional female on the school board
increases academic performance over the next three years. While some effects appear to exist in
the shorter run (one or two years), the magnitude tends to be smaller and estimates are not as
significant. For example, the 1-year and 2-year point estimates for changes in total API scores are
about 3.2 (p-value: 0.20) and 6.2 (p-value:0.21), respectively. This suggests that while an impact
may exist in earlier years, it takes a while for change to occur. The larger effect occurs after several
years of the female serving on the board. This is plausible since board policies and personnel
changes may not take effect immediately.
2.4.2 Superintendent Separations
As already mentioned, several theories try to explain why board diversity may yield benefits. Given
the available data, it is not possible to distinguish the two here. But, estimating whether board
gender composition affects the likelihood of a superintendent separation may provide insight con-
cerning the boards’ monitoring roles. Boards have responsibility for how district employees provide
educational services. In practice this often means holding the district superintendent responsible
for academic performance. With the data available, I can observe superintendent separations. This
may indicate whether the gender composition of the board influences how the board executes its
monitoring role as an agent of the public.
I use a similar RD approach but with the outcome being whether a superintendent separation
occurred. While I do not know if the separation was voluntary or not, any significant estimates
would suggest board gender composition influences how a district monitors the superintendent’s
performance. Furthermore, an impact on the superintendent could be a proxy for how well a board
is able to work with all district staff to implement policies.
As shown in Table 2.5, an additional female on the school board decreases the likelihood a
54
Figure 2.3: Total API Change in 3 Years
Graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the forcing variable. The forcing variable is the
female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A linear trend fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close races. A
move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election. Thus, the
discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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superintendent separation occurs. An additional female reduces the probability the superintendent
separates by about 10 percent. Figure 2.4 illustrates this effect. While I cannot clearly connect
positive academic performance with the lower rate of separation, this does show gender can influence
how a board monitors. This is in line with Adams and Ferreira (2009) who also find gender
differences in corporate monitoring. More generally it connects with the recent literature showing
group gender composition can influence personnel decisions (Bagues and Esteve-volart 2009).
2.5 CONCLUSION
How board gender diversity affects organizational performance remains an open question in the
corporate governance literature. However, much less attention has been given to how diversity can
influence public sector performance. I use objective measures of school performance and find that
increasing the number of females on a school board on average helps failing schools perform better.
Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain how diversity might improve organizational
performance, referred to as the resource dependent and agency theories. The agency theory says
that diversity helps a board better monitor organizational personnel. I find that in fact the gender
composition of the school board does influence whether the district superintendent separates from
his or her position. Though the connection with academic performance is unclear, it does appear
that board gender composition influences how a board functions as an agent. Exploring the relative
importance of the resource dependent and agency theories in explaining organizational performance
improvements is therefore an important direction for future research.
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Figure 2.4: Superintendent Separations
Graph plots the local averages for the vertical axis variable against the forcing variable. The forcing variable is the
female minus male vote percentage for the closest candidates of each gender on each side of the winning threshold
in the previous election. A linear trend fit to the data illustrates any discontinuity around extremely close races. A
move from left to right across the zero represents a switch from a male to female winning a close election. Thus, the
discontinuity represents the effect on the vertical axis variable of this change.
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3.0 GENDER AND GROUP DECISION MAKING: EXPERIMENTALLY
CONNECTING INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP BELIEFS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Economic decisions are frequently made by groups rather than individuals. Decisions to hire and
promote in the labor market are good examples. Corporate boards hire new CEOs, school boards
select district superintendents, and recruiting committees choose new faculty members. Even for
lower-ranking positions, the decision to hire an employee is often made with input from multiple
individuals. When considering such collective decisions, a natural question is how characteristics
of individual decision makers might influence a group’s collective choice. Addressing this ques-
tion, recent work has considered how the gender composition of a hiring committee influences its
evaluation of job candidates (Bagues & Esteve-Volart 2010). This research, carefully exploiting
observational data and a natural experiment, provides interesting insights but lacks the ability to
show how gender interactions within the committees shape the final decision. That is, the data
reports a groups’ collective decision but lacks information on individual group members’ beliefs.
This means it is impossible to map individual members’ beliefs into the collective decision or see
how members’ genders (or any other characteristics) interact in the deliberation process.
Using an experimental design, I seek to avoid this problem while studying how a group’s gender
composition affects its evaluation of “job candidates.” In the experiment, the “job candidates”
presented to subjects are male/female pairs that have previously competed in a skill task. I first
elicit each subject’s personal beliefs by having them evaluate male/female candidate pairs after
viewing the candidates’ pictures side-by-side. To do this subjects must report in percentage terms
how likely they believe each job candidate is to have performed best in the previously held skill
competition. Then, I randomly assign subjects to groups of varying gender compositions. These
groups must collectively evaluate the same side-by-side candidate pairs. In this way, I can study
60
how individuals’ beliefs and gender influence the groups’ collective decisions. In particular, I can
see whether a “group shift” occurs. A group shift occurs when the group deviates significantly from
the outcome that would occur if all members’ individual beliefs were aggregated through simple
majority voting without discussion (Ambrus, Greiner, & Pathak 2009). A group shift indicates the
outcome cannot be simply explained by individual pre-deliberative beliefs. If group shifts in fact
occur, I can then try to understand whether within-group gender interactions might account for
such shifts.1 By studying the decision in this way I can provide new insights into how mixed-gender
groups interact to evaluate job candidates.
My findings fit well with the most relevant empirical field study of this issue. Bagues and Esteve-
Volart (2010) consider whether the gender composition of randomly-assigned, Spanish judicial
candidate evaluation committees affects the committees’ decisions regarding male and female job
candidates. As far as I am aware, this is the only study to use a large sample and credible
identification strategy to isolate the effect in question.2 Overall, Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010)
find a positive relationship between more female committee members and better evaluation of male
candidates. However, a careful look at their results shows this pro-male effect occurs only on the
committees when females are a small (but non-zero) minority and when females are the majority.3
Furthermore, it is important to realize this effect is identified off of decisions for marginal candidates,
presumably those where members were not in substantial agreement. This is important because it
will inform how my experimental results should be appropriately compared to results from the field.
In fact, I find a remarkably similar pattern as Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010) in situations where
group members’ individual beliefs indicate strong pre-deliberation disagreement within a group. In
these cases, five-member groups with one female or with four females both favor male candidates
on average, while two- and three-female groups do not. This is qualitatively similar to the pattern
found in the field.
Several mechanisms might explain why more female decision-makers in a group could lead to
better evaluations for male candidates.4 The obvious possibility is that females individually evaluate
1Ambrus, Greiner & Pathak (2009) present a survey of past work on group shifts in general and discuss the leading
theories from social psychology to explain such shifts.
2Several papers do address the relationship between hiring committee gender composition and choice of job
candidate (Ehrenberg, Jakubson, Martin, Main, & Eisenberg 2009; Kurtulus & Tomaskovic-Devey 2009). These
studies though fail to answer the question at hand primarily because an organization’s gender composition can also
influence the supply of job applicants of each gender. In Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010), the candidate pool is
independent of the committee gender compositions.
3For instance, Table 3.5, Column 4, of Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010) shows that having females compose between
10% and 30% of the committee significantly increases the male success rate. However, the effect is statistically zero
for committees with 30% to 50% females. Then, for majority female committees the positive effect returns.
4Caution must be made in accepting this statement without nuance. As discussed above, Bagues and Esteve-
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male candidates relatively more favorably (or female candidates less favorably) and thus more
females in a group will produce a more pro-male outcome. Such individual-level gender differences
may exist in the labor market because females (males) over-evaluate male (female) candidates,
because females (males) have a stronger affinity for working with males (females), because male
(female) candidates interview better with females (males), because male (female) members are more
aggressive toward male (female) interviewees, or because evaluators consciously seek to counteract
same-gender bias. Using information on individual beliefs, I can test whether individual beliefs
explain the group decisions.5 I do this by testing for a “group shift” - calculated as the difference
between the group decision and the median member’s decision. I find that 4-female/1-male groups
and 1-female/4-male groups both significantly shift in favor of the male for pairs where there is
substantial pre-group disagreement (i.e. the type of cases Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010) identify
off of). As indicated by a “group shift” in these cases, simple aggregations of individual members’
beliefs does not fully account for the groups’ choices. That is, something about gender interactions
must contribute to the group outcome in some cases.
Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) suggest one such explanation which relies on group members’
interactions. They posit that the presence of women in the committees affects the choices of male
committee members such that male members increasingly favor male candidates. However, another
explanation not explored by Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010) is that a given member’s influence on
the decision depends on his or her gender and perhaps the gender composition of other members.
For example, a male may be more likely than a female to challenge the committee if he disagrees
with the majority opinion. His willingness to do so might even depend on how many other males
and females are in the group. In the present study, I offer evidence that gender may explain a
member’s differential influence in the collective decision and result in the observed group shifts.
I find that in groups which shift significantly, where there is substantial pre-group disagreement
among members, that males who disagree with the majority are much more successful than similarly
situated females in moving the group toward their belief. In a four-female, one-male group the pre-
group beliefs (according to the individual elicitation) will favor the male on average. When the male
is the strongest supporter of the female candidate, this male is significantly more likely (relative
Volart (2010) find a pro-male effect for majority female groups and for small minority female groups (less than 30%,
but not zero). Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010) highlight this non-linearity and suggest their results are consistent
with two hypotheses: (i) women in committees favor male candidates; (ii) men in committees favor male candidates
when sitting in mixed-gender committees.
5Of course, I cannot say as much about why a preference exists. Note however that some of the possibilities (e.g.
preference for working together, performance in interviews) are explicitly ruled out by my experiment since evaluators
and candidates never interact.
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to a female member) to move the group toward the female candidate. In one-female, four-male
groups the pre-group beliefs favor the female. However, a male who strongly dissents and is most
favorable toward the male candidate, is much more capable than a similarly situated female in
moving the group’s decision toward his belief. So, in both situations, a male member who a priori
strongly dissents with most group members influences the outcome much more than a female in
such a position.
This evidence paints an interesting picture. When part of the minority opinion, males manage
to “make their opinion heard” better than females. If females perhaps do not challenge the majority
opinion by staying silent, the group will only incorporate a fraction of the members’ beliefs into
the decision which effectively “pushes” the collective decision further toward the majority opinion.
If males do express their dissent from the majority opinion, they are able to “pull” the collective
decision toward their beliefs. This process - one of differential influence in the collective decision -
provides a viable explanation for why groups with more extreme gender compositions are observed
to shift toward the male candidate.
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
The experiment consisted of two types of sessions: a “contender” session and a “decider” session.
The contender session, conducted first, generated the data on “job candidates” which were then
used in the decider sessions. Subjects in the decider session were given information about subjects
from the contender session for purposes of evaluating how likely it was each contender performed
best in the skill task. For this reason, it was important the deciders were unfamiliar with the
contenders, outside of the experiment so I conducted the contender session at the University of
Pittsburgh - Johnstown and the decider session at the University of Pittsburgh - Main Campus.
While in the same system, these campuses operate separately and there is no evidence deciders
recognized any subjects in the contender session. Contender session subjects were recruited from
introductory economics classes near the experiment site. Decider session subjects were recruited
through the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Lab (PEEL) recruiting system and sessions were
conducted on-campus in a space that allowed for the isolated meeting of multiple groups. Sessions
were conducted in the Spring and Summer of 2010. Two contender sessions and three decider
sessions were conducted. Instructions used in the sessions are provided in the Appendix.
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3.2.1 Contender Session
After subjects (henceforth, “contenders”) signed the consent form, an experimental assistant took
a photo of each from the shoulders up. This occurred prior to explaining the experiment procedure.
Contenders were asked to remove any sunglasses for the pictures. Contenders were told the pictures
and information about their performance may be shown in other experiment sessions at a different
school.
The experimenter then explained that subjects would be paid $10 for participating in the
experiment but had the opportunity to earn more through their performance on the task. The
session consisted of two stages. At the end of the session, one stage was randomly selected for
payment. In Stage 1, contenders had five minutes to sum sets of five two-digit numbers (e.g.
13+15+67+90+45) without a calculator. All contenders had the same sets of problems and were
provided with pencils and a sheet with sets to sum and space to answer. If Stage 1 was selected
for payment, each correct sum earned $0.50 and incorrect answers did not decrease payoffs.
In the Stage 2, contenders were randomly matched with someone else in the room. Contenders
were told they would compete in a one-on-one competition with whomever they were matched with,
though no one was told who they were competing against (even after the session). Using a similar
adding task as in the previous stage, if Stage 2 was selected for payment, contenders earned $1
for each correct sum if they won the head-to-head competition. The loser earned nothing. In the
event of a tie, each contender was paid for half of their correct sums. After completion of Stage
2, selection of the stage to be paid, grading of answers, and determination of winners and payoffs,
contenders were paid and excused. The contender sessions lasted approximately thirty minutes
each.
3.2.2 Decider Session
Prior to the decider sessions, the contender session photos and Stage 1 (i.e. non-competitive piece
rate) performance data were used to make “contender pairs.” Including Caucasian contenders only,
subjects were separated based on their quartile of performance in Stage 1, then randomly paired
with a contender of the opposite gender. The photos of each contender were placed next to each
other and labeled “A” or “B.” The position of the contenders (A or B) was randomly assigned. In
the pictures, contenders’ bodies were covered so only the contenders’ heads were visible. Below each
pair of contender photos, a label indicated the pair’s non-competitive performance quartile (First
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being poorest, Fourth being best). Same-gender pairs were also created so the study’s investigation
of gender was not obvious. Through this process, a set of 27 contender pairs (18 opposite gender)
was created for display in the decider sessions.
Each decider session was designed for forty subjects, twenty of each gender. Upon entry to the
decider session, deciders were given a ticket with a subject number (1 through 40). Unbeknownst
to the subjects, males received odd numbers and females received even numbers. Subjects were
told they would receive $7 for participating in the session but could earn more depending on their
decisions in the session. Subjects were told there would be four stages. To determine payments,
one decision from Stage 1 and and one decision from Stage 2, 3, or 4 would be randomly selected.
Deciders were then told about the contender sessions and how they would be presented with
pictures of contender pairs that also indicated the quartile those contenders fell in during the
non-competitive task. It was clear the pictures were taken before the tasks. In Stage 1 of the
decider sessions, subjects were asked to individually decide which member of a contender pair
scored the most points in the head-to-head competition. Reporting their beliefs about how likely
each contender was to win was a two-step process. First, using a sheet provided, deciders chose
either contender “A” or “B” as the highest scorer. Second, deciders reported in increments of
five from 50% to 100% how likely their favored contender was to have solved the most sums. A
higher percentage meant the favored contender was more likely to be the higher scorer. Reporting
50% meant the decider believed the contenders were equally likely to score highest. In Stage 1, all
deciders simultaneously evaluated all 27 contender pairs as they were displayed at the front of the
room.
I implemented an elicitation mechanism designed to mitigate risk-averse subjects’ tendency to
bias downward their reported beliefs. If a decision was selected for payment, the payment amount
would be determined as follows: A number between 50 and 100 would be publicly drawn. If the
random number was greater than or equal to the percentage chosen for one’s favored contender, the
decider earned $10 with a probability corresponding to that random number (i.e. if 60 was drawn,
the decider would face a lottery with 40% chance of winning nothing and 60% chance of winning
$10). In this case the payoff does not depend on which contender actually scored more points.
However, if the random number drawn was strictly less than the decider’s reported percentage,
then the decider earned $10 if their favored contender won and $0 if their favor contender lost. If
the contenders tied and the payoff depended on the outcome, the decider earned $5. Deciders were
reminded that this elicitation mechanism means they should always choose a percentage for their
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favored contender equal to what they actually believe.
Once Stage 1 finished, deciders were sent to nearby, but visually and verbally separate, rooms
listed on the ticket they were given upon entry. Stages 2, 3, and 4 took place in these rooms. For
each stage subjects were reassigned to different groups as directed by the room numbers on their
tickets. By design, deciders’ room assignments generated for each stage eight groups of five with
varying gender compositions. Group gender compositions were (1 female, 4 males), (2 females, 3
males), (3 females, 2 males), and (4 females, 1 male). In each stage, there were two groups of each
gender composition. Furthermore, groups were assigned so that no two individuals were ever in the
same group in different stages.6
Once in the group, an assistant told the group they would see some of the same contender pairs
from Stage 1. This time however, they must make a collective decision concerning which contender
scored highest using the same method of reporting. The assistant then one at a time displayed
some of the contender pairs. In each stage, 9 of the 27 pairs were displayed. No instructions were
given about how the group must decide and assistants were instructed to not participate in the
discussion or point to either contender. If the group took two minutes to deliberate on a pair, the
assistant prompted the group to make a decision. The assistant then recorded on paper and out
of sight the decision verbally reported by the group members. Each group deliberation was video
recorded and subjects were told to ignore the camera. The same procedure took place in each
group in Stages 2, 3, and 4.
After Stage 4, subjects returned to the main room. Decisions were selected for payment, ran-
dom numbers were drawn to determine payoffs, and subjects completed a questionnaire about
themselves. Subjects were paid for their decisions and excused. Average earners were $21.50. Each
session lasted approximately ninety minutes.
3.3 RESULTS
Results are presented in three parts. First, individuals’ decisions over contender pairs from Stage
1 are presented. Second, group decisions are presented. In particular, I show which groups shift
significantly. I discuss how these experimental results relate to the Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010)
6One session did not fill completely. In this case, several groups were not full. These groups are not used in the
analysis.
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study which relied on a natural experiment and field data. For the appropriate comparison groups,
the pattern is remarkably similar. Third, I explore how individual group members’ genders and
Stage 1 beliefs influence the collective decisions in Stage 2, 3, and 4. Results point to a key gender
dynamic as partially explaining the observed group shifts. Also, Table 3.1 summarizes deciders’
characteristics.
Table 3.1: Subject Characteristics
Decider Characteristics
Variable Mean
Percent Male 48.3
Percent White 71.5
Age (Years) 21.35
(3.89)
Years of College 3.47
(1.13)
Number of Subj. 116
3.3.1 Individuals’ Decisions
Table 3.2 shows deciders’ Stage 1 decisions. Decisions are displayed by gender and contender pairs’
pre-competitive performance quartiles (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4). Reported values represent the deciders’
“wagers” on the male contender (ranging from 0 to 100), representing deciders’ beliefs about how
likely the male is to win.7 In all, deciders evaluated six, four, five, and three contender pairs from
Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4, respectively. This data presents a striking picture about how males and
females perceive the contenders. For the lowest performing quartile, Q1, on average males prefer
the female contender and females prefer the male contender. That is, male and female deciders
disagree on average about who will score highest. For the second quartile, Q2, male and female
deciders do not disagree at conventional levels. For the third quartile, Q3, male and female deciders
7All decisions were reported by subjects as described in the procedure. For analysis, all decisions are reported as
wagers on the male contender in the pair.
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agree on average in favor of the male contender. Finally, for the highest performing quartile, Q4,
both male and female deciders favor the male contenders but males more strongly prefer the males
than do the females. Considering all quartiles together, the point estimates are not statistically
different and in fact obscure substantial differences of opinion between male and female deciders
depending on the pair quartile. Figure 3.1 plots kernel densities of individual wagers on the male
for each quartile. The patterns described above are also apparent in these distributions. For Q1,
the female decider distribution is shifted toward higher wagers on the male while the male deciders
shift toward higher wagers on the female. Substantial agreement appears in Q2 and Q3, but male
deciders’ greater enthusiasm for Q4 males is also apparent.
Table 3.2: Individual Wagers on Male
Individual Wagers on Male Contender
Quartile Both Males Females M - F Difference
1 49.3 47.2 51.7 -4.55**
(0.8) (1.0) (1.2) (1.58)
2 50.2 51.3 48.9 2.35
(0.9) (1.3) (1.3) (1.83)
3 56.7 55.4 57.7 -2.28
(0.9) (1.3) (1.2) (1.77)
4 56.2 59.2 52.7 6.51**
(1.4) (1.8) (2.1) (2.80)
All 52.8 52.4 53.2 0.87
(0.5) (0.7) (0.7) (0.96)
Number of Subj. 116 56 60
Table shows, by pre-competitive performance quartile and decider gender, the average individual (Stage 1) wager on
the male contender. The wager on the male contender is the deciders’ reported belief about how likely it is the male
outscored the female in the head-to-head skill competition. The far right column estimates the difference in means
between male and female deciders within a pair quartile. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parenthesis.
Statistically significant differences are indicated: (*): 10%, (**): 5%, (***): 1%.
In general, all deciders prefer males more often in higher quartiles. This presumably is due to
perceptions about men and women’s math skill and competitiveness (Niederle & Vesterlund 2007;
68
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Individual Wagers on Male Contender
Each frame shows the male and female decider distributions of individuals’ Stage 1 wagers on the male contender
for each pair quartile. (Quartile 1 = lowest performance). The wager on the male contender variable is the deciders’
reported beliefs about how likely it is the male outscored the female in the head-to-head skill competition.
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Gneezy et al 2003). What is relevant for this study is that for low-performing quartiles, male and
female deciders disagree on average about which contender is better. In the group meetings, this
disagreement should provide the greatest opportunity for gender interactions to appear. That is,
the pairs for which members are most in disagreement should reveal whether one gender is more
likely to hold sway in the collective decision. For pairs where members agree more on average,
gender effects may still occur but could be less likely and smaller in magnitude. If a priori most
or all members agree on the male contender, then perhaps there will be less need for deliberation
or give-and-take.
This point is especially important when qualitatively comparing the results with field studies
such as Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010). That study estimates how different evaluation com-
mittee gender compositions affects male and female job candidates success. Since candidates are
randomly assigned to committees this presents a nice natural experiment for isolating the effect
of gender composition. Of course, the estimates are identified off marginal candidates (as opposed
to high-quality, sure passes or low-quality, sure fails). Presumably a marginal candidate from the
committee’s point of view is one where board members disagree substantially. In the present ex-
periment, the individual results in Table 3.2 indicate that lowest quartile pairs (Q1) are the ones
where the most disagreement exists across genders. Thus, results from these quartiles are what
should appropriately be compared with the applied results in Bagues & Esteve-Volart (2010).
3.3.2 Groups’ Decisions
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report, by gender composition and pre-competitive performance quartiles, group
members’ and groups’ decisions. Table 3.3 reports average wagers (0 to 100) while Table 3.4 reports
the fraction choosing the male. In both tables, the top panel reports the average of all the group
members’ Stage 1 decisions. This shows what group members believed prior to deliberations. The
bottom panels show the average collective decisions of the groups. In these panels one can compare
raw group decisions by pair quartile and group gender composition. For the high-performing
quartiles (Q3 and Q4), groups on average favor the male though there is variation across gender
compositions. With low-performing quartiles (Q1 and Q2), all groups except those with two females
favor the male though typically to a lesser extent than for high-performing quartiles. By comparing
the top and bottom panels in each table, it appears some differences exist between group members’
a priori beliefs and the reported group decisions.
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Table 3.3: Individual and Collective Wagers on Male
Group Member’s Avg. Wagers on Male Contender
Quartile 1 Fem. 2 Fem. 3 Fem. 4 Fem.
1 47.6 48.5 51.5 50.6
(2.0) (1.7) (2.5) (1.7)
2 49.5 49.9 51.4 50.1
(1.8) (2.0) (1.4) (1.8)
3 54.1 57.5 56.7 57.2
(0.9) (1.1) (1.0) (1.2)
4 54.3 58.8 55.7 56.5
(2.1) (3.0) (3.5) (2.7)
Group Wagers on Male Contender
Quartile 1 Fem. 2 Fem. 3 Fem. 4 Fem.
1 52.1 48.5 50.2 53.5
(2.0) (3.0) (3.0) (1.9)
2 52.9 46.2 51.2 54.2
(2.4) (2.9) (3.1) (3.1)
3 52.7 58.2 57.2 53.8
(2.3) (3.3) (3.6) (3.5)
4 59.4 64.7 58.8 56.4
(4.7) (5.2) (3.8) (4.6)
Top panel reports, by pre-competitive performance quartile and group gender composition, the mean wager on the
male contender of all members in a group. Bottom panel reports the same groups’ mean collective wagers on the
male contender. Standard errors clustered by group and individual are in parenthesis.
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To formally test whether groups produce different results from that suggested by members’
beliefs, I compute for each pair the difference between each collective decision and the median
member’s decision. This difference represents any “group shift” that occurred and will indicate to
what extent individual preferences account for the group decision. Table 3.5 shows these results.
All standard errors cluster on both the group and individual level. The top panel reports shifts in
wagers while the bottom panel reports discrete shifts from the median member’s favored contender.
Figure 3.2 shows box plots of the same group shifts for each quartile and gender composition. In
only a small number of cases is there a statistically significant shift. Specifically, shifts occur in
one or four female groups evaluating lowest quartile pairs (Q1). Also, two- and four-female groups
facing second lowest quartile pairs (Q2) also indicate a shift. Since low quartiles are where the
most disagreement exists (based on Stage 1 individual beliefs), it is reasonable gender effects would
show up here, if any where.
However, the gender compositions for which shifts occur are equally interesting. For Q1 pairs,
where the strongest effect would be expected, the extreme gender compositions (1 female/4 males;
4 females/1 males) show a significant shift toward the male contender. For Q2 pairs, the most
female group also shifts toward the male contender while the second most male group shifts toward
the female contender. Other group compositions in the lower quartiles do not indicate a group
shift. Groups evaluating higher-quartile pairs also do not shift significantly. This leads to the first
key finding: many group decisions can be fairly well explained by individual preferences (i.e. those
with no significant shifts), yet some groups shift substantially.
The pattern of shifting, particularly for the Q1 pairs, is qualitatively similar to Bagues and
Esteve-Volart’s (2010) findings. In their study, groups with small, non-zero female representation
and groups with majority female representation both favored males. Groups with middling female
representation showed no differential preference for one candidate gender. So, the experimental
results - when focusing on the marginal cases analogous to those in Bagues and Esteve-Volart
(2010) - strongly agree with findings in the field. In both cases a pro-male shift occurs at similar
group gender compositions.
72
Table 3.4: Fractions of Individuals and Groups Choosing Male
Pct. Of Group Members Choosing Male Contender
Quartile 1 Fem. 2 Fem. 3 Fem. 4 Fem.
1 41.4 45.0 50.4 52.1
(4.7) (4.4) (6.0) (3.8)
2 50.5 49.0 51.2 46.3
(5.0) (5.3) (4.4) (4.7)
3 60.7 66.3 61.7 64.7
(1.8) (1.1) (1.9) (2.6)
4 52.8 72.7 60.0 66.4
(4.7) (6.6) (7.8) (6.5)
Pct. Of Groups Choosing Male Contender
Quartile 1 Fem. 2 Fem. 3 Fem. 4 Fem.
1 52.8 41.7 50.0 66.7
(8.9) (7.5) (10.8) (8.9)
2 57.1 33.3 52.9 65.8
(9.5) (10.2) (11.8) (9.9)
3 63.3 70.0 60.0 55.0
(6.7) (7.3) (11.5) (8.8)
4 66.7 83.3 69.2 59.1
(9.3) (9.7) (12.8) (11.4)
Top panel reports, by pre-competitive performance quartile and group gender composition, the average proportion
of group members favoring the male contender. Bottom panel reports the average proportion of groups’ collective
decisions which favor the male contender. Standard errors clustered by group and individual are in parenthesis.
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Table 3.5: Group Shifts
Group Minus Median Member Wager on Male
Quartile 1 Fem. 2 Fem. 3 Fem. 4 Fem.
1 5.69* 0.50 0.00 3.96**
(3.29) (2.34) (2.69) (1.58)
2 1.19 -5.48** 0.00 6.84*
(3.68) (2.70) (4.13) (3.83)
3 -4.00 -1.67 1.83 -4.50
(4.04) (4.20) (3.71) (4.00)
4 6.11 4.33 0.77 0.91
(5.00) (6.94) (6.34) (3.31)
Group Choice Minus Median’s Choice of Male
Quartile 1 Fem. 2 Fem. 3 Fem. 4 Fem.
1 0.18 0 0.02 0.17*
(0.12) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
2 0 -0.21** 0 0.21
(0.16) (0.10) (0.19) (0.14)
3 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.12
(0.13) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10)
4 0.14 0.07 0 -0.09
(0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.11)
Top panel reports, by pair pre-competitive performance quartile and group gender composition, the average group
shift in the wager on the male contender. For each decision, the group shift is the collective wager minus the Stage
1 wager of the median group member on the pair in question. Positive (negative) values mean the group shifted
toward the male (female) contender, relative to the median member. The bottom panel displays directional shifts on
the extensive margin. The shift is calculated as the collective choice (1 = male favored) minus the median member’s
choice. Standard errors clustered by group and individual are in parenthesis. (*): 10%, (**): 5%, (***): 1%.
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Figure 3.2: Group Minus Median Member’s Wager
Each frame shows group shift data for a pair quartile. Within each quartile, the range of shifts (calculated as the
difference between a group’s wager on the male minus the median individual’s wager on male) is shown for each
gender composition. The shaded box represents the range of the middle two data quartiles.
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Of course, results for Q2 pairs are more perplexing. Based on the individual beliefs, we would
expect to find less of an effect since the intra-group disagreement is less stark for Q2 pairs. Fur-
thermore, the two-male groups’ decisions on Q2 pairs may be a statistical outlier, only choosing
the male contender 33% percent of the time. This is by far the lowest average rate of any group
and thus far defies simple explanation. Henceforth, analysis will mostly focus on Q1 pairs since
these results are most comparable with field studies this experiment is meant to complement.
In summary, the group decisions provide important pieces of information. First, by carefully
considering the most relevant cases (Q1 pairs), I am able to replicate in the lab the results of the
most relevant field study. Second, I show there are group shifts related to gender which cannot
be explained solely by individual preferences over contenders. This points to the possibility that
gender interactions within the group are partially driving the collective decisions. In the next
sub-section I present a possible explanation for these shifts by mapping individual group members’
decisions into the groups’ decisions.
3.3.3 Individual Influence and Interactions on Group Outcomes
Since some groups’ decisions cannot be fully explained by members’ beliefs, I investigate whether
gender interactions may explain the shifts. Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) propose two hy-
potheses: (i) women in committees favor male candidates and (ii) men in committees favor male
candidates when sitting in mixed-gender committees. As revealed by a sizable group shift, the first
hypothesis does not fully explain the Q1/4-female decisions. The second hypothesis also is less than
satisfying because two-female groups do not shift at all toward the male. It is hard to explain with
the second hypothesis why one-female groups would shift while two-female groups would not. This
suggests another explanation is needed. In this section, I offer such a theory and provide evidence
to help explain both of the observed shifts for the Q1 pairs.
In mapping individual group members’ beliefs (elicited in Stage 1) to groups’ decisions, I am
particularly interested in whether male and female group members have differential impacts on
moving the group toward their personal belief about the contenders. That is, in a given situation
is a male more or less likely relative to a female to be able to affect the group’s decision? To do
this I rank each group member based on how he or she wagered on the pair in question. Rank
1 is most pro-male in the group while Rank 5 is most pro-female in the group. I then estimate
the effect of a male relative to a female in a given rank being able to move the group toward his
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position. I construct as an outcome the absolute difference between the group’s decision and the
member in the given ranked position. I then regress this constructed variable on a binary variable
(1 = male) indicating the gender of the member occupying the rank, conditional on all the wagers
of all group members. The coefficient on this indicator variable estimates for a given position in
the group how likely a male relative to a female is to move the group near his or her Stage 1 belief.
If the estimated coefficient is negative, this means a male is more able than a similarly situated
female to reduce the distance between his individual belief and the group’s decision. A positive
coefficient means a female is more able than a similarly situated male to bring the group decision
toward her belief.
Table 3.6 shows coefficient estimates and standard errors for each gender composition/quartile/rank
combination. All standard errors are clustered on the group and individual levels. Significant es-
timates appear for several cases, but given the small sample sizes some of these are likely due to
statistical variation. However, directing attention to the lowest quartile (Q1) cases in the topmost
panel where significant group shifts occurred (1 female and 4 female groups), an interesting and
consistent pattern emerges.
In the 1 female/Q1 case (top left corner of Table 3.6) a male decider in the most pro-male
position (Rank 1) manages to pull the group toward his belief a significant amount as evidenced by
the -8.77 coefficient. In these one-female groups, the a priori beliefs of the mostly male group favor
the female because for Q1, male deciders on average favor the female (recall the Stage 1 beliefs
presented in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, Top Panels). So, the most pro-male decider in these groups
will usually be in the minority opinion. In this case, the coefficients estimate a male in the minority
opinion moves the group closer to his Stage 1 belief than a similarly situated female.
In the 4 female/Q1 case (top right corner of Table 3.6) a male decider in either the most pro-
female (Rank 5) or second-most pro-female (Rank 4) positions manages to pull the group decision
toward his Stage 1 belief more than a female at either rank. In these groups, the a priori beliefs of
the mostly female group favor the male because for Q1, female deciders on average favor the male
(again, refer to Tables 3.2 and 3.3, Top Panels). In these groups the most pro-female decider will
tend to be in the minority opinion. As before, the males in the minority opinion positions are more
successful in pulling the group toward their beliefs than similarly situated females.
Taken together, these results point to a potentially important element of group gender inter-
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Table 3.6: Gender and Rank Effects on Group Shifts
Effect of Male Being in Rank, Cond’l on All Wagers
Quartile Rank 1 Female 2 Female 3 Female 4 Female
1
1 -8.77 (4.22)** -4.94 (3.14) 4.59 (6.03) -5.24 (5.41)
2 -4.48 (4.74) 5.01 (5.22) -6.16 (3.62)* -0.49 (4.32)
3 -3.57 (5.68) -1.37 (3.21) 5.29 (5.53) -3.94 (6.21)
4 1.06 (3.95) -7.4 (2.48)*** 1.50 (3.99) -8.32 (3.47)**
5 -1.95 (7.35) 5.10 (5.56) -0.58 (5.34) -12.96 (5.12)**
2
1 3.82 (7.86) 0.60 (4.13) -5.82 (4.99) -1.66 (3.39)
2 2.34 (5.72) -2.06 (4.10) -8.17 (3.52)** 0.75 (6.58)
3 -1.30 (6.40) 4.64 (4.53) -9.30 (4.46)** 19.37 (9.96)*
4 21.18 (6.16)*** 1.19 (2.38) 2.21 (9.41) -4.89 (6.53)
5 -3.78 (22.2) -2.21 (3.448) 7.91 (11.43) 6.31 (9.98)
3
1 18.20 (6.36)*** -6.66 (8.60) -4.69 (5.86) 6.09 (6.39)
2 22.20 (2.26)*** -4.05 (4.46) 4.79 (4.80) -2.12 (6.55)
3 -5.44 (11.03) -6.08 (6.88) 9.69 (4.54)** 5.88 (6.43)
4 -4.87 (7.29) 4.40 (5.68) -11.92 (3.62)*** -6.51 (7.67)
5 24.20 (44.34) -5.34 (7.49) 2.36 (4.95) 8.64 (4.86)*
4
1 4.67 (20.61) 0.42 (4.53) 4.32 (3.94) -2.4 (28.06)
2 -19.41 (3.49)*** 1.96 (5.34) -8.39 (2.18)*** -2.90 (13.48)
3 -2.33 (4.15) -8.00 (1.27)*** 4.57 (3.60) 18.89 (1.02)***
4 48.39 (12.14)*** 4.71 (4.94) -12.77 (7.73)* 0.74 (1.36)
5 -15.16 (11.08) -6.44 (5.39) 3.69 (9.05) 7.82 (8.63)
Each coefficient estimate is the result of a regression, for the specified quartile and gender composition, where the
outcome variable is the absolute difference between the group’s wager and the Stage 1 wager of the member in the
given rank. Reported coefficients are on an indicator for whether the member occupying the rank is male (=1) or
female (=0). Regressions also control for Stage 1 wagers of all members by rank, pair fixed effects, and session
fixed effect. Rank 1 is the most pro-male member. A positive (negative) coefficient means a female (male) was
more effective in moving the group toward her (his) Stage 1 belief. For Q1 estimates, note that the groups’ a priori
preferences favor on average females in the one-female groups and males in the four-female groups. This means the
males found to have influence in both cases are in the minority opinion. Standard errors clustered by groups and
individuals. (*): 10%, (**): 5%, (***): 1%.
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actions. Males and females who find themselves (randomly) part of the minority opinion differ in
how likely they are to pull the group toward their belief. This actually ties-in nicely with one of
the leading theories for why group shifts occur: the “persuasive argument theory” (Burnstein et
al., 1973; Brown, 1974). The theory states that the pool of arguments in one direction are more
persuasive. One possibility, is that females are less likely to challenge the majority opinion which
effectively makes the majority opinion appear even more persuasive. So, in both cases a male in
the minority opinion is more effective in influencing the decision.
While the possibility that females might have less influence in some decisions is an important
finding, this can also help explain the pattern of group decisions observed in this study and Bagues
& Esteve-Volart (2010). If females are on average less likely to influence the group when in the
minority position, this should produce systemic patterns. In the 4-female/1-male groups the most
pro-female members (Rank 4 or Rank 5) will usually be a female (even though males on average
are more pro-female for Q1 pairs) and will therefore most of the time not challenge the majority’s
pro-male priors. Thus, the Rank 4 or Rank 5 female’s opinion is not incorporated into the collective
decision and the outcome is skewed toward the male more often than not. In the 1-female/4-male
groups, the most pro-male member (Rank 1) will usually be a male (even though females on average
are more pro-male for Q1 pairs) and will therefore most of the time challenge the majority’s pro-
female priors. This causes the group more often than not to incorporate the most pro-male opinion
and move toward the male contender. Furthermore, if the female in the group tends to not challenge
any strong opinions then this effect may exacerbated. Finally, in 2- or 3-female groups no effect
occurs. In these cases it is less likely a clear majority prior exists, and it is more likely there will be
males of opposing opinions. These males may challenge each other with the result being roughly
the median member’s wager.
3.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This experiment provides important insight into gender interactions within evaluating committees.
A key question motivated by the empirical literature is whether individual committee members’
preferences can fully account for the collective decision. Carefully-executed work (Bagues and
Esteve-Volart 2010) finds that the gender composition of evaluation committees influences how
the committees evaluate male and female job candidates. But, these studies are unable to say
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how much of these differences are due to individual committee members’ preferences and how
much are due to interactions within the group. Using an experimental design where I sequentially
elicit individuals’ then groups’ evaluations of male-female candidate pairs, I observe how individual
beliefs map into the group decisions. First, I find a pattern similar to that found by Bagues
and Esteve-Volart (2010) where relevant groups with a small minority of females or a majority of
females favor male candidates. Second, I show this effect is not fully explainable by group members’
individual preferences. Third, I show evidence that males who disagree with other group members
are much more successful than a similarly situated female in moving the collective decision toward
their belief. This effect can partially explain why some groups shift in systematic ways from the
individual members’ beliefs.
This study’s findings also point toward further research questions. For instance, it is not clear
from the data why exactly dissenting males’ opinions matter. Perhaps these males assert themselves
more? Or, perhaps dissenting males and females speak-up at similar rates and groups place less
weight on the female’s opinion? Is there evidence that only some members are participating?
Analysis of group discussions may provide useful information about these issues. Furthermore, it
may be interesting to study differences in group deliberations when most members agree a priori
versus when there is disagreement. It would be interesting to learn whether one gender is more
likely to lead discussions or make firm statements about their beliefs. Do members ever clearly
change their public beliefs? While my study points with data to one mechanism, a richer picture
may be developed through detailed analysis of group discussions.
Finally, these findings can guide policy related to group decision-making procedures. One of the
arguments for diversity on committees and boards is that better outcomes result (Carter et al. 2007;
Smith et al. 2006; Erhardt et al. 2003). However, the present analysis indicates some members’
opinions are systematically incorporated less. This means some of the benefits from diversity may
not be realized. If some group members’ opinions are systematically excluded from the collective
decision, a slight procedural changes could help regain the benefits of having a diverse group of
decision makers. For example, group members could independently and anonymously record their
evaluations before a group discussion. Then the anonymized evaluations would be made public to
the group. This might increase the likelihood each members’ position is fully considered.
80
APPENDIX
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
NOTE: In the instructions below, all bracketed (i.e. [ ]) sentences are actions to be executed by the
researcher and/or his assistants. All other text is to be read in the session in the order presented.
A.1 CONTENDER SESSION INSTRUCTIONS
Good morning/afternoon. Thank you for coming to this experiment. This session should last less
than 30 minutes, and you will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. Please read the consent
form along with me and sign it if you still want to participate. [Researcher reads the consent form
aloud.] These pictures and information about how you perform in the tasks in this experiment will
be displayed in later sessions of this experiment at the University of Pittsburgh. This information
will not be used at your school here or displayed outside the experiment. Are there any questions?
[After answering subjects’ questions, proceed.] [Take 2 head-shot pictures of each subject.]
Now I will explain the first task and how you will earn money.
Stage 1
This experimental session has two stages. For completing both stages you will be paid $10. How-
ever, you can earn more money through your performance in the experiment. At the end of both
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stages, one stage will be randomly selected. Your performance in that stage, and only that stage,
of the experiment will be used to determine how much money you earn in addition to the $10 you
are sure to earn for completing both stages of the session.
In stage 1 you can earn money by adding a series of five randomly-chosen two-digit numbers (e.g.
13+ 15+ 67 + 90+45). Calculators are not allowed. You will have five minutes to add as many sets
of numbers as possible. If stage 1 is randomly selected at the end of the session, you will get $0.50
for every correct sum. Your payment will not decrease if you provide an incorrect answer. Here is
an example of the task you will have. [Display the example task.] You will place your answer from
adding up the five numbers in the empty space. Your score will be the number of correct sums you
get in total. I will inform you each minute how much time remains. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand, otherwise on my signal the task will begin. You will have five minutes to
add as many sets as possible.
[Have subjects complete first timed task.]
Stage 2
For stage 2 of the session, you have been randomly paired with someone else in this room. You
will now compete against this person in a one-on-one competition. As before, you will have five
minutes to add five randomly-selected two digit numbers. This time, however, you will only earn
money if you have more correct answers than the person you are paired with. You will not learn
who you are paired with if this stage is selected for payment.
The person in each pair who correctly adds the most sums in five minutes will earn $1 for each
correct answer if stage 2 is randomly selected. The person in each pair with the lowest number of
points will not earn any extra money if stage 2 is selected for payment. In the event of a tie, each
person in the pair will receive half of the number of correct answers. Enter your answers exactly as
before. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, otherwise on my signal the competitions
will begin. You will have five minutes to add as many sets as possible.
[Have subjects complete second timed task.]
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Stage Selection and Payoffs
Both stages are now complete. Will someone volunteer to select a stage out of this hat? [Volunteer
selects card from hat.] Please announce which stage you selected and verify the other slip of paper
contains the other stage number.
Please proceed to the exit and I will pay your earnings one at a time.
[Make payments for each subject based on their performance in the randomly selected stage.]
A.2 DECIDER SESSION INSTRUCTIONS
[Upon entry, each subject is given a ticket with their subject number and a consent form.]
Good afternoon. Thank you for coming to this experiment. This session should last about 90
minutes, and you will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. I will explain in a moment
how you earn money. Before we begin, please read and sign this Consent Form. The consent form
explains that your personal information will be protected and you can leave at any time and this
will not be held against you.
[Collect consent forms]
[Pass out INSTRUCTIONS and INDIVIDUAL ANSWER SHEETS]
Stage 1
This experimental session has four stages. For completing all the stages you will be paid $7. How-
ever, you can earn more money through your performance in the experiment. At the end of all four
stages, we will randomly select one of your decisions from Stage 1 and one of your decision from
either Stage 2, 3, or 4. This means you will be paid for two of your decisions today plus the fixed
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$7. We will randomly select these decisions right here in everyone’s view after the last stage. Since
only two stages will be chosen, you want to do your best for every decision.
In this experiment, you will be asked in different situations to make decisions about how people
performed in an actual competition. The decisions you are involved in and the actual outcomes of
the competition will be the basis for calculating how much you earn.
Here’s how you earn money: You will be shown pictures of a series of contender pairs. The con-
tenders are students at Pitt-Johnstown and participated in an experiment on March 17, 2010.
During the experiment they were asked to solve a series of small problems. First, contenders had
five minutes to add as many sets of five two-digit numbers as they could. They earned $0.50 for
each correct sum. The second time they were in a head-to-head competition with someone else in
the room. The contenders did not know who they were competing against - just that they were
competing. The contender who solved the most problems won $10 while the loser won nothing.
Both contenders had the same problems. Your task will be to guess which of two contenders solved
the most problems in the competition. Note that the pictures were taken at the beginning
of the experiment before the competition.
You will see pictures of contender pairs one by one. Here is an example. On the left is contender
“A” while on the right is contender “B”. At the bottom, you are given information about how both
contenders performed in the initial, non-competitive task compared to a larger group of contenders.
In this example, both contenders’ scores in the first, individual task were in the “second highest
quartile.” Quartiles break up a population into the lowest 25%, second lowest 25%, second highest
25%, and highest 25%. Being in the highest quartile means the contenders scored better on the
initial task than at least 75% of other contenders. Being in the second highest means a contender
scored better than at least 50% but worse than at least the best 25% of contenders.
As I show each pair, you will decide which contender scored the most points in the head-to-head
competition. This is a two step process. First, report who you believe won (A or B). Then choose
a percentage between 50% and 100% to describe your belief. Only choose increments of five: 50,
55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, or 100. Choosing a higher number means you think your favored
contender is more likely to win.
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Let’s say you think Contender A is certain to win in the competitive task. Then you will mark on
your sheet “A” in the first space for this pair. In the second space you will then put 100% because
you are sure A will win. But, let’s say instead you think B is slightly more likely to win. You would
write B in the first space and then might choose 65% for the second spot. This means “Overall, I
think B is 65% likely to win the competition.” If you think the contenders tied, then write TIE in
the first space and 50% in the second space. Notice that all the numbers you write should be 50%
or higher because you are describing how likely your favored contender is to win.
Here’s how we will determine your payment for a given choice. Once the experiment is complete
and we have selected pairs for payment, we will publicity draw a random number between 50 and
100. If this random number is greater than or equal to the percentage you chose for
your favored contender, then you will earn $10 with a probability corresponding to
that random number. For example, if you chose 70% on Contender A to describe Contender A’s
likelihood of winning, and a random number of 80 is drawn then you would have an 80% chance of
winning $10. If 85, 90, 95 or 100 are drawn as the random number then you have an 85, 90, 95 or
100% chance, respectively, of winning $10. Notice that this does not depend on which contender
won the competition. Also notice that if you choose the contenders to tie your payoff will for sure
be determined based on the random number because the random number will always be greater
than or equal to 50%.
But, if the random number chosen is less than the number you chose, then you will
win $10 if your favored contender wins and $0 if your favored contender loses the
competition. So, returning to our example, if you chose 70% on Contender A and the random
number is 50, 55, 60 or 65 then you would win $10 only if A wins. But, if B wins then you win
nothing. If the contenders tied and your payoff depends on the outcome you will win $5.
This situation means you should always choose a percentage for your favored con-
tender according to what you actually believe. If you report a percentage above or below
what you actually believe this will only lower your expected payoff. If you choose a percentage
lower than what you believe you can expect to earn less than if you reported what you believe.
Keep this in mind and try to choose percentages closest to how likely you actually believe each
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contender is to win.
Also, as you make your decisions, keep in mind that while the contenders in a pair scored in the
same quartile initially their competitive performance was often very different. For instance, fre-
quently a contender jumped up or down one or two quartiles in the competitive task relative to the
individual task. Overall there is substantial variation in how a contender performed competitively
compared to individually. Try to use your best judgment to determine which contender scored
when competing. Remember it is always best to report what you actually believe and reporting a
tie will guarantee your payoff is determined randomly regardless of which contender scored more
points.Are there any questions?
At this time, please verify the sheet in front of you has the subject number from your ticket.
[Show first pair of contenders.]
Using the sheet in front of you, please write down your wager for Pair A. Hide your wager behind
your folder. Remember to choose your favored contender and then a number between 50% and
100% which indicates how likely you believe that contender is to win. After you finish, please
quietly wait for the next pair.
[Show all 27 pairs.]
This is the end of Stage 1. Now you will go to your assigned rooms. Please turn in your answer
sheet as you leave. Follow the assistant for your room as I call you.
Stages 2, 3, and 4
[Experiment assistant reads script aloud to the group.]
Now I will show you some of the same contender pairs you already saw and wagered on in Stage 1.
In this stage however you will all discuss together how you would like to wager on each contender
pair. As I show you a pair, you will take as much time as necessary to agree on a wager together.
Report your wager exactly as before: state the group’s favored contender (A or B or TIE) and what
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percentage between 50 and 100% you place on that contender. You may only report increments of
5, such as 50, 55, 60, etc.
Payoffs will be determined exactly as described earlier. The only difference is that if a decision from
this round is randomly selected for payment everyone in this group’s payment will be determined
by the group’s decision.
As I show each pair, carefully consider all the information available to you and discuss how you
would like to wager as a group. When you have agreed, please announce your decision to me and
I will record it. Remember, just like before, it always benefits you to report a wager equal to what
you actually believe.
Here is the first pair. Please discuss among yourselves how you want to wager and report your
decision to me.
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